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The focus of this research was to evaluate the 
Department of Defense’s (DoD) effectiveness of implementing 
acquisition reform through workforce training. The research 
examined several acquisition reform initiatives proposed 
since 1990 and DoD’s primary sources of acquisition 
workforce training.  A survey was conducted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of training sources as perceived by 
acquisition workforce members.  The data gathered from the 
sample of 411 responses indicated survey respondents were 
only “somewhat” satisfied with the training received in 
support of acquisition reform.  The Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) resident courses, Government funded 
training and in-house acquisition reform advocates were 
rated as “most effective” sources of training.  These three 
sources provided training perceived as adequate to 
functionally implement reform initiatives and targeted to 
members’ work responsibilities.  In contrast, training 
provided by DoD’s Acquisition Reform Week, DAU web-based 
courses and non-Government sources were perceived  “least 
effective” sources of acquisition reform.  Research results 
suggest DoD increase its focus on recently implemented 
Continuous Learning Policy, strengthen and support the role 
of in-house acquisition reform advocates, and increase the 
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The Department of Defense’s (DoD) capability to 
accomplish its mission is significantly impacted by its 
ability to acquire supplies and services.  DoD acquisition 
personnel have been exposed to a rapidly changing 
environment forcing DoD to dramatically reform the way it 
manages the acquisition process.  Constrained resources, 
large reductions in the size of the acquisition workforce 
and changes in the commercial environment have driven 
several major acquisition reform initiatives.  These 
acquisition reform initiatives involve business practices 
that have substantially differed from existing practices 
and procedures, resulting in the need for significant 
workforce training.   
The challenge of implementing acquisition reform 
initiatives through training cannot be underestimated 
considering the acquisition workforce size, occupational 
diversity and geographical dispersion.  In addition, the 
number, frequency and magnitude of reform initiatives have 
further compounded difficulties implementing meaningful 
acquisition reform.    
It is clear acquisition reform has been a success at 
the policy level.  Current acquisition reform initiatives 
have been developed after extensive planning by DoD senior 
acquisition leadership and appear to be consistent with 
achievable goals that should result in substantial 
improvements in the acquisition process.  Unfortunately, 
  1
the true success of acquisition reform remains with 
effective implementation at the acquisition workforce 




The purpose of this research is to evaluate the DoD’s 
effectiveness of implementing acquisition reform 
initiatives through workforce training programs.  The 
primary focus of the research is on workforce perceptions 
regarding the adequacy of training supporting select 
acquisition reform initiatives.  This research will attempt 
to identify potential areas of improvement necessary to 
establish and implement acquisition reform training 
objectives for the DoD Acquisition Workforce. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The following primary research question will be 
addressed in this thesis: 
• Are the Department of Defense acquisition reform 
initiatives fully supported by current 
acquisition workforce training? 
Subsidiary research questions are: 
• What is the recent history of Acquisition Reform 
with the Department of Defense? 
• What training is available to the Department of 
Defense acquisition workforce supporting 
Acquisition Reform initiatives? 
• Does the acquisition workforce perceive that 
available training effectively supports 
Acquisition Reform implementation? 
  2
 
D. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This thesis examines select acquisition reform 
initiatives and associated acquisition workforce training 
implemented by the DoD since 1990.  The primary focus of 
the research and corresponding conclusions and 
recommendations are based on the acquisition workforce 
survey conducted by the author and the supporting 
literature review. 
Literature research included a review of Government 
and professional journal articles, Federal and DoD 
regulations, policies and procedures, Defense Acquisition 
University course materials, and United States General 
Accounting Office reports.  The majority of these documents 
were obtained through publicly available Internet 
resources.  The scope and research methodology associated 
with the acquisition workforce survey is discussed in 
Chapter IV. 
The thesis is focused on a limited number of 
acquisition reform initiatives due to the magnitude of 
changes proposed since 1990 and limitations associated with 
the survey conducted supporting this research.  Eleven 
reform initiatives were selected based on their potentially 
broad application across various acquisition workgroups, 
commands and services considering mission diversity.  
Rationale for selection of specific acquisition reform 




E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 
This thesis is divided into the following four 
chapters: 
Chapter II, Literature Review and Background, provides 
a review of select acquisition reform initiatives and 
acquisition workforce training since 1990. 
Chapter III, Survey Methodology, Data and Analysis, 
discusses and analyzes the results of the acquisition 
workforce survey. 
Chapter IV, Conclusions and Recommendations, provides 
a summary of the thesis findings and potential areas of 
improvements. 
  4
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical 
review of select DoD acquisition reform initiatives and 
acquisition workforce training and education sources in 
effect since 1990.  This chapter also includes brief 
discussions regarding events driving acquisition reform 
within the DoD and barriers to acquisition reform 
implementation.  The information presented in this chapter 
provides a conceptual basis for understanding and examining 
the analyses, recommendations and conclusions provided in 
subsequent chapters.   
 
B. EVENTS DRIVING ACQUISITION REFORM 
 
The last decade for the DoD acquisition workforce 
could best be characterized as one of constant change, as 
exhibited by the continuous stream of acquisition reform 
initiatives.  The pace of change has not subsided.  
According to author and acquisition scholar Stanley 
Sherman, “…new [reform] proposals emerge almost daily”.1 
Since 1991, the impetus for DoD to implement various 
acquisition reform initiatives can be attributed to: 
• Increased reliance on acquiring commercial 
products 
• Increased importance of Service contracting 
• Budgetary constraints 
                     
  5
1 Sherman, Stanley N., “Public Purchasing Reform: Have FASA, FARA, and ITMRA 
Made the System Better?”, On-Line, http://www.fasmg.org/sherman2.html, May 
1997. 
• Acquisition workforce reductions 
 
1. Reliance on Commercial Products 
Historically, DoD has been the leader in supporting 
and encouraging new technology through the development of 
“state-of-the-art” weapon systems.  Unfortunately, DoD’s 
leadership in developing new technology has not only faded, 
DoD now finds itself unable to timely acquire commercially 
developed new technology.  Advancements in commercial 
technology far exceed DoD sponsored research and 
development in areas that are critical underlying 
technologies to support the development of next generation 
military systems.  The DoD Military specification structure 
is predominately out-dated, no longer recognized by the 
commercial marketplace as the “standard.”  There is no 
evidence DoD’s preeminence in supporting research and 
development will return, considering DoD’s Research and 
Development (R&D) dollars, adjusted for inflation, have 
decreased 31 percent since 19852.  Recognition of these 
facts has forced the DoD acquisition community to find new 
ways of acquiring and leveraging emerging technological 
opportunities developed by commercial sources. 
One of the most significant challenges facing the 
acquisition workforce in leveraging new and emerging 
technology has been private industry’s reluctance to do 
business with the DoD3.  This is especially true in markets 
such as the semiconductor industry where DoD is no longer 
                     2 General Accounting Office. “Federal Acquisition: Trends, Reforms, and 
Challenges”, GAO/T-OGC-00-7, March 16, 2000. 
  6
3 Defense Acquisition Deskbook. “Secretary of Defense Acquisition Reform: 
Mandate for Change”, September 2, 1994. On-line, 
http://web2.deskbook.osd.mil/scripts/rwisapi.dll. 
the dominant customer.  Between 1965 and 1995, DoD’s share 
of all U.S.-produced semiconductors fell from 75 percent to 
approximately one percent4.  In this and other high tech 
industries, DoD can no longer dictate terms and conditions 
under which firms will sell their products.  According to 
DoD leadership, costly administrative procedures mandated 
by Congress have added little value to DoD acquisition 
process; and the intrusive nature of Government contract 
oversight and potential loss of proprietary data discourage 
beneficial public-private partnerships5.  The requirement 
for commercial organizations to establish and maintain 
separate business procedures to account for DoD’s mandated 
cost and accounting data is both disruptive to commercial 
business practices and is considered by many (inside and 
outside DoD) to carry costs far exceeding potential 
benefits. 
 
2. Increased Importance of Service Contracting   
 
The DoD has recently recognized the value of 
outsourcing services currently performed in-house as a 
means of focusing efforts on core missions and 
responsibilities.  Outsourcing has especially gained 
momentum in functional areas where DoD has not been able to 
compete with the private marketplace to recruit and/or 
retain a qualified workforce.  Outsourcing these types of 
services enables DoD to focus on core competencies 
consistent with best commercial business practices and 
ls.  acquire critical skil                     4 Ibid, 3. 
  7
5 Ibid, 2. 
Outsourcing is also a politically popular vehicle to 
reduce the size of Federal Government and as such has 
received renewed attention.  This attention has been in the 
form of recent legislation including the 1998 Federal 
Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act discussed below.  
Within DoD, reform of service contracting will also 
continue to receive increased attention since it now 
constitutes the largest contracting category by dollar in 
the Federal Government as indicated by the following chart6: 
 
 
Contracting Dollars (Constant 1999 Dollars)
62 74 72 76 71 78
101 100 79 68 65 64













Services R&D  Supplies
Figure 2.1. Contracting Dollars (From: Federal 
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6 General Accounting Office.  “Federal Acquisition: Trends, Reforms and 
Challenges”, GAO/T-OGC-00-7, March 16, 2000. 
3. Budgetary Constraints   
 
DoD’s budget constitutes a significant portion of the 
discretionary Federal budget; it will come under increasing 
scrutiny as Federal entitlement programs such as social 
security and health care demand greater resources.  
Internally, the DoD has been forced to make budgetary 
decisions at the expense of force modernization.  
Considering aging weapon system platforms, force reductions 
and the increasing acquisition lead-times for complex 
systems, this trend cannot continue if DoD hopes to 
dominate the battlefield into the next decade and beyond.  
Funding challenges have been compounded by a 22 percent 
decrease in defense spending over the last eleven years as 
exhibited by the following chart (constant 2002 dollars):  
 



















Figure 2.2. Defense Spending (From:  Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), August 2001. 
 There is no reasonable expectation of sustainable 
increases in the defense budget considering the growth of 
entitlement programs and the political realities of deficit 
spending.  Therefore, potential cost savings and/or cost 
avoidance from acquisition reform initiatives has been 
identified as a major opportunity to finance much needed 
force modernization7.  
 
4. Acquisition Workforce Reductions   
 
Congressionally mandated reductions have decreased the 
acquisition workforce by 42 percent since 19898.  This 
reduction in the workforce without a corresponding workload 
reduction has forced DoD to search for and implement reform 
initiatives that enable the acquisition workforce to more 
efficiently and effectively manage defense acquisition 
processes.  These acquisition reforms require extensive re-
training throughout the workforce and a shift in 
organizational culture that has been rule bound for 
decades.      
 
C. MODERN ACQUISITION REFORM 
 
Although acquisition reform could conceivably be 
traced back to the Hoover Commission in 1949, the “modern” 
                     7 DefenseLink, “Reform Initiatives: Reorienting the Way DoD Does Business”, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar1999. 
  10
8 Office of Secretary of Defense. “Report to Congress: Actions to Accelerate 
the Movement to the New Workforce Vision”, On-line, 
http://acq.osd.mil/ar/912crpt.htm, April 1, 1998. 
era of acquisition reform commenced in 1986 with the 
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 
(Packard Commission).  The results of DoD acquisition 
reform initiatives evolving from the Packard Commission and 
implemented since 1990 are observable in many of today’s 
acquisition practices.  This historical review of 
acquisition reform initiatives will be limited to a group 
of initiatives implemented since 1990.   
The majority of acquisition reform initiatives 
proposed prior to 1990 were in response to isolated 
criminal incidents, public outcry of perceived wasteful 
purchases and major weapon systems cost overruns.  Prior to 
1990, acquisition reform could best be characterized as a 
constraint to acquisition workforce decision making.9  Since 
1990, acquisition reform initiatives have been proposed in 
response to the rapidly changing business environment, 
allowing greater latitude in the decision-making processes. 
Many current acquisition reform initiatives have their 
foundations in a few different legislative acts.  These 
include: 
• Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) of 1990 
• Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 
1994 
• Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996  
• Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR) of 
1998 
In addition to these acts, select initiatives germane 
to the research survey used in this study are examined at 
the end of this section.  They include 
                     
  11
9 Ibid, 1. 
evolutionary/incremental acquisition strategy, share-in-
savings contracts, performance-based contract payments, 
alpha contracting and integrated process teams.  The 
rationale for including these initiatives is discussed in 
Chapter III, Survey Methodology.  This section concludes 
with a discussion of barriers to acquisition reform.  
 
1. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 
1990 
 
Although not typically considered an acquisition 
reform initiative itself, the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) is one of the major milestones that 
has shaped the way education and training is provided to 
DoD acquisition personnel.  DoD-provided education and 
training of the acquisition workforce is recognized as the 
key to successful acquisition reform implementation10.  The 
purpose of this section is to provide an overview of DAWIA.  
The types and methods of acquisition reform training 
provided as a result of DAWIA will be discussed later in 
the Acquisition Reform Training section of this chapter.  
The Defense Acquisition Workforce Act (DAWIA) of 1990 
(Public Law 101-510) required the Secretary of Defense, 
acting through the Under Secretary of Defense (then 
Acquisition & Technology), to establish education and 
training standards, requirements and courses for the DoD 
civilian and military workforce.  Two requirements of 
interest to the subject research resulted from DAWIA, the 
establishment of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
                     
  12
10 Verton, Daniel. “Defense Gets Tough with Acquisition Training Criteria”, 
Federal Computer Week, January 25, 1999, pp. 14-15.  
and certification standards for specific career 
fields/assignments.   
 
a. Defense Acquisition University   
 
The DAU was established on October 22, 1991 under 
DoD Directive 5000.57.  The purpose of DAU is to: 
• Educate and train acquisition professionals for 
DoD 
• More effectively coordinate the existing sixteen 
Army, Navy, Air Force and DoD schools 
• Develop education, training, research, and 
publication capabilities for DoD in the field of 
acquisition 
In April 1998, seven years after DAU was 
established, DAU transitioned from a consortium of unique 
service sponsored schools into a unified “corporate 
university” with five regional and seven training sites 
providing mandatory, assignment-specific and continuing 
education courses for military and civilian personnel. 
 
b. Certification Standards 
 
DoD Directive 5000.52-dated October 25, 1991, 
established mandatory experience, education, and training 
standards for specific acquisition workforce position 
categories, career fields and certification guidelines for 
acquisition workforce members.  DAWIA divided each 
acquisition position category into three career levels for 
the purpose of establishing qualifications for 
  13








Basic/Entry level, establishes 
fundamental qualifications and expertise in 
Individual’s career field 
II GS-9/12 
0-3/4  
Intermediate/Journeyman level, initial 
emphasis on specialization, career 
development including rotational assignments 




Advanced/Senior level, cross functional 
perspective, focus on issues cutting across 
organizational boundaries  
 
Table 2.1. DAWIA Certification Levels. 
 
As an example, the current Level III DAWIA 
certification standard for the GS-1102, Contracting, career 
series according to DoD Directive 5000.52 includes: 
 
a. EDUCATION:  Have ONE of: 
1. Baccalaureate degree 
2. At least 24 semester hours among: 
accounting, law, business finance, contracts, 
purchasing, economics, industrial management, 
marketing, quantitative methods, organization and 
management 
3. At least 10 years acquisition experience as 
of 1 Oct 91.  (Those individuals meeting this 
criteria where “grand- fathered” and need not 
meet any other education requirement). 
(Desired) Master's degree in Business 




Four years contracting experience 
(Desired) An additional four years of contracting 
experience 
c. TRAINING: 
CON 301 Executive Contracting  
Prerequisites: CON 201, CON 204, and CON 210 
(Should be taken every 3-5 years as a refresher, 
but does not have to be repeated to maintain 
certification) 
CON 333 Management for Contracting Supervisors 
Prerequisite: At least one year experience in a 
contracting position after receiving Contracting 
Level II certification 
(Desired) 2 weeks Management and Leadership 
Training 
2. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 
 
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 
1994 was a product of Vice President Gore’s National 
Performance review.  FASA was the first major legislative 
effort to provide meaningful reform to the Federal 
acquisition process by establishing legislative foundations 
to adopt and incorporate best commercial practices.  As 
noted by Sherman11, FASA was a substantial movement away 
from decades of increasingly restrictive Federal 
acquisition laws and regulations providing the acquisition 
workforce with greater discretion in decision-making.  FASA 
                     
  15
11 Ibid, 1. 
resulted in a significant number of individual reform 
initiatives impacting a range of topics including: 
• Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
• Commercial Items 
• Past Performance Evaluation 
• Alternative Dispute Resolution 
• Electronic Data Interchange 
• Performance Based (Service) Contracts  
• Performance Based Contract Payments 
 
a. Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) 
 
FASA provided DoD acquisition workforce personnel 
with a more streamlined process for acquiring purchases 
under the simplified acquisition threshold (then and now 
$100,000.0012).  Specifically, buying organizations were no 
longer required to solicit, evaluate and award relatively 
low dollar value contracts utilizing the same laborious 
procedures reserved for much more complex procurements.   
FASA not only permitted streamlined procedures, 
it eliminated burdensome paperwork associated with larger 
procurements.  FASA eliminated many certification 
requirements such as FAR 52.223-5, Certification Regarding 
a Drug-Free Workplace, and compliance with several clauses 
and provisions ranging from FAR 52.52.215-1, Examination of 
Records by Comptroller General, to the requirement to 
identify suppliers and sources of supply.  Initially, 
authority to utilize SAP up to the simplified acquisition 
threshold was limited to those organizations that had fully 
                     
  16
12 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101. 
implemented Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) into their 
acquisition process (discussed below).  Those not utilizing 
EDI were provided with increased authority up to only 
$50,000.00 pending Federal Acquisition Network (FACNET) 
implementation.    
A second component of SAP included the initiation 
of the “micro-purchase” concept for acquisitions under 
$2,500.00.  Previously, any purchase under the simplified 
acquisition threshold was reserved (“set-aside”) 
exclusively for small businesses as defined by Federal 
Acquisition Regulations.  The micro-purchase concept 
provided wide discretion to the source of the purchase and 
significantly reduced documentation.  This relief was of 
significant importance for two reasons.  First, purchases 
under $2,500.00 constituted a large percentage of all 
procurement actions and attached a relatively high 
administrative cost.  Second, the benefits of allowing 
individuals outside the purchasing office to use the 
Government Purchase Card within the $2,500.00 micro-
purchase threshold was gaining wide-spread acceptance.  The 
Government Purchase Card allows organizations to buy goods 
and services directly from vendors without processing 
request through procurement offices, thus substantially 
reducing cycle time and administrative costs.  Today, the 
Government Purchase Card is widely used throughout DoD.  In 
FY2000, DoD organizations made approximately 10 million 
transactions under $2,500.00 worth $5.5 billion utilizing 
the Government Purchase Card program13.  
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13 DoD Purchase Card Program Office, “EDI Slide Briefing”, undated.  
On-line, http://192.86.241.22/RIA.ppt. 
b. Commercial Items   
 
Enactment of FASA encouraged the procurement of 
commercial or “off-the-shelf” products in place of 
purchasing to Government-unique specifications.  This was 
done with the intent of reducing costs and developing new 
business sources with those firms previously reluctant to 
comply with burdensome Government requirements that are 
inconsistent with best commercial practices.  Specifically, 
FASA included an expanded definition of commercial items, 
and offered additional exemptions from: 
• Submission of cost and pricing data required 
under the Truth in Negotiating Act (TINA),  
• Compliance with cost accounting standards (CAS) 
and  
• Other Government unique requirements on 
commercially designated items up to $100,000.00. 
 
c. Past Performance Evaluation   
 
FASA emphasizes the relevance and propriety of 
evaluating a contractor’s past performance as a critical 
source selection factor.14  FASA required evaluation prior 
to contract award of past performance information for 
negotiated procurements in excess of $1,000,000.00; and, 
after full implementation in 1998, the criterion value was 
lowered to $100,000.00.  Previously, past performance 
information was used informally to support responsiveness 
and responsibility determinations.  Past performance 
evaluation as a source selection factor is consistent with 
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1999.  On-line: http://www.govexec.com/procure/articles/0195prs2.htm. 
best commercial practices that recognized the importance of 
contractor past performance. 
Notwithstanding FASA’s emphasis on past 
performance as an evaluation factor, the Federal Government 
and DoD have yet to fully benefit from best commercial 
practices in this area.  The DoD Past Performance Automated 
Information System (PPAIS) is not uniformly updated in a 
timely manner or consistently utilized by acquisition 
personnel across all services.  In addition, there is a 
cultural resistance to using past performance as a 
meaningful discriminator because it is thought to be too 
subjective.15  Even DoD recognizes that past perform as a 
critical source selection factor has not been fully 
implemented as intended and re-issued the initiative in 
November 2000 as a key strategy in support of Price-Based 
Acquisition.16  
 
d. Alternative Disputes Resolution 
 
The purpose of Alternative Disputes Resolution 
(ADR) is to provide a method of resolving disputes that is 
less fractious than normal litigation venues.  ADR 
furnishes the Government and contractor the opportunity to 
resolve differences in less expensive and more expedient 
forums such as mediation or arbitration.  FASA placed 
renewed emphasis on broad implementation of the previous 
Alternative Disputes Resolution Act of 1990 by requiring 
that agencies choosing not to use ADR must provide 
                     15 Ibid, 12. 
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Acquisition”, November 29, 2000. 
justification in writing.  FASA also encouraged the use of 
ADR as a proactive partnering technique to establish 
mutually satisfactory goals and identify expectations in an 
effort to prevent future disputes. 
 
e. Electronic Data Interchange   
 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), also commonly 
referred to as Electronic Commerce, was introduced to 
convert the paper intensive DoD acquisition process into a 
computer-based automated process built on a standard 
electronic format.  Electronic commerce networks not only 
provide wide access to a geographically dispersed supplier 
base but also increase the potential to efficiently manage 
the supply chain from inventory, requisitioning and 
ordering functions to vendor payment.  FASA required the 
creation of an EDI network called Federal Acquisition 
Network (FACNET). 
 
f. Performance-Based Contracts   
 
Performance-Based service contracting was a 
reform initiative proposed under FASA to address the 
increasing importance of service contracting.  The 
Government’s preferential approach to service contracting 
previously relied on defining how the contractor was to 
accomplish a specific effort.  Performance-based service 
contracting was introduced as a method of reducing 
acquisition costs and improving contractor performance by 
encouraging innovative approaches to conducting the work 
  20
within desired outcomes.  Like many acquisition reform 
initiatives, performance based service contracting was not 
a new idea.   
The initiatives to utilize performance-based 
contracting were originally proposed by the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy in 199117.  Today, the initiative 
to implement widespread use of performance-based contracts 
has only made modest progress.  During the period October 
2000 through March 2001, Government-wide performance-based 
service contracts only accounted for 15 percent of total 
obligations for services.18   
 
g. Performance Based Payments   
 
DoD’s traditional method of making interim 
contract payments has been based on process inputs (“cost-
based”).  The initiative to move to performance-based 
payments reduces performance risk to the Government and 
more accurately associates contract progress with 
financing.  Performance based payments also have the 
potential to incentivize contract performance, reduce 
administrative effort, reinforce program manager roles, and 
increase technical and schedule focus.19  The contractor 
benefits from performance based payments by being provided 
access to a larger percentage of the overall contract value 
prior to final completion.  Table 2-2 summarizes the 
                     17 United States Office of Procurement Policy. “Policy Letter 91-2, 9 Apr 
1991. 
18 United States General Accounting Office. “Contract Management: Improving 
Service Acquisitions”, GAO-02-179T, November 1, 2001. 
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19 Acquisition Reform Today. “Performance-Based Payment”, Vol. 6, No. 2, 
May/June 2001, p. 2.  On-line: http://www.acq.osd.mil/ar. 































Table 2.2. Progress Payment Rates (From: Federal 
Acquisition Regulations. 
 
3. Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Clinger-Cohen), also 
know separately as the Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
(FARA) of 1996 and the Information Technology Management 
Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996, made further advances to those 
initiatives implemented under FASA.  Among the most 
important changes included: 
• Amended Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
• Amended Commercial Items procedures 
• Permitted Efficient Competitive Range 
Determinations 






a. Simplified Acquisition Procedures   
 
The Clinger-Cohen Act increased the authority to 
use simplified acquisition procedures for commercial items 
initially granted under FASA from $100,000.00 to  
$5,000,000.00, enabling DoD to significantly reduce 
acquisition related costs associated with acquiring low 
risk, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items.  Second, it 
allowed procuring organizations to utilize simplified 
acquisition procedures for all requirements between 
$50,000.00 and $100,000.00 without the use of FACNET (as 
required under FASA).  This relief was granted to allow 
additional time for the Government to fully implement 
Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data Interchange and to 
leverage the benefits from the reduced administrative 
expenses associated with simplified acquisition procedures.  
Third, it eliminated Government requirements frequently 
cited by private industry as barriers to conducting 
business with the Federal Government. 
 
b. Commercial Item Definition   
 
The Clinger-Cohen Act broadened the definition of 
commercial items, eliminated certain certifications 
required by law.  The legislation also initiated an 
examination of procurement laws and regulations potentially 
inconsistent with acquiring commercial products, and 
exempted commercial-off-the-shelf items from Cost 
Accounting Standards (CAS) and submission of cost and 
pricing data required under TINA. 
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c. Efficient Competitive Range Determinations   
 
The Clinger-Cohen Act permitted the Procuring 
Contracting Officer to limit the number of proposals to be 
considered for award (“competitive range”) to an efficient 
number while still complying with the precepts of the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984.  Previously, 
the general rule of thumb followed the adage “when in 
doubt, leave in”.  Under FARA, “when in doubt, leave out” 
may be considered more appropriate. 
 
d. Information Technology Acquisitions  
 
The Information Technology Management Reform Act 
made substantial changes to the acquisition of information 
technology including revocation of the General Services 
Administration (GSA) as the mandatory purchaser and manager 
of Information Technology (IT).  This legislation also 
transferred the IT protest forum from the GSA Board of 
Contract Appeals to the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
and established the position of agency Chief Information 
Officers.  These changes were in response to the increasing 
importance of acquiring IT and the rapid evolution of 
information technology.                
 
4. Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 
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The Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act was 
signed into law on October 12, 1998 (Public Law 105-270) 
requiring Federal agencies to submit to congress and make 
publicly available each year an inventory of all activities 
performed by Federal employees not inherently Governmental 
in nature.  A function (activity) that is performed by the 
commercial marketplace is one not generally considered to 
be inherently governmental in nature.  The purpose of the 
act was to use outsourcing to increase productivity and 
enhance quality at the lowest costs through competitive 
forces in the commercial marketplace.   
Outsourcing of Government functions is not a new 
initiative beginning with the introduction of FAIR.  Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, Performance 
of Commercial Activities, originally published in 1966 and 
revised in 1996, provides specific guidance on whether a 
Federal activity should be commercially obtained and 
specific processes for conducting the public-private 
competition.  FAIR expanded, clarified and codified some of 
the policy guidance provided under OMB Circular A-76 into 
law, mandating agencies to proactively examine outsourcing 
as a potential source of cost savings.  Outsourcing of 
Governmental activities has become increasingly important 
as Federal agencies seek ways to reduce costs while 
maintaining acceptable levels of service to the public.  In 
February 2002, DoD agreed to study competing (outsourcing) 
70,000 positions, or 15 percent of positions identified 
within DoD to be “commercial like”20.  Although outsourcing 
has gained some notoriety and momentum in the last few 
years, DoD and other Federal agencies have failed to make 
meaningful gains.  Outsourcing, like many reform 
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February 4, 2002, p. 1, 18. 
initiatives, has been mistakenly viewed as a panacea for 
budget shortfalls when attention should be directed towards 
re-engineering business processes.  Even the Department of 
Navy has recognized that “…the Navy is far from having 
achieved the anticipated and necessary savings [from 
outsourcing]”.21      
 
5. Other Recent Acquisition Reform Initiatives   
 
The remaining initiatives discussed below and examined 
during the research survey were selected from Under 
Secretary of Defense J.S. Gansler’s memorandum dated 
November 29, 2000, regarding Price-Based Acquisition.  The 
initiatives followed panel recommendations resulting from 
Section 912c of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
FY 1998. 
 
a. Evolutionary/Incremental Development 
Strategy   
 
Evolutionary/Incremental development is a risk 
mitigation strategy allowing for the incremental fielding 
of technological improvements (“blocks”) after they reach 
some pre-defined level of maturity.  These block upgrades 
may be initially defined in the acquisition strategy but do 
not prevent the fielding of the basic configuration or 
contract completion.  One of the primary benefits of such a 
strategy is to enable the program to maintain schedule by 
on unproven technology.  Evolutionary reducing dependence                      
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21 United States Department of Navy. “Implementation of Acquisition Reform: 
Outsourcing Initiative”, April 1998.   
development strategy has its foundations in life cycle 
management and system engineering concepts prior to 199422. 
 
b. Incentive Term Contracting   
 
Incentive term contracting provides the vendor an 
opportunity to earn additional contract periods of 
performance based on good past performance.  This 
initiative is mutually beneficial to the Government and 
contractor.  The Government is able to reduce 
administrative costs by reducing the number of procurement 
actions and reduces overall acquisition risk by continuing 
performance with a proven source.  The contractor also does 
not have to incur additional expenses re-competing for the 
same effort and is able to amortize these and other 
applicable fixed costs over a longer period of performance, 
providing the opportunity for increased profit by reducing 
overhead expenses.   
 
c. Share-in-Savings Contracts   
 
Share-in-Savings contracts allows the Government 
to leverage limited resources by requiring the contractor 
to initially fund a project in return for a percentage of 
substantiated savings realized by the Government.  Share-
in-Savings type contracts have their conceptual foundations 
in the Value Engineering (VE) program establish by the DoD 
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Review Handbook; April 1994. 
in 196323.  Like the share-in-savings type contract, a VE 
Change Proposal clause incorporated into contracts prompted 
contractors to independently develop changes beneficial to 
the Government.  Contractor-suggested improvements 
beneficial to the Government above and beyond contract 
requirements result in a pro-rated sharing of substantiated 
savings. 
Two substantial challenges to share-in-savings 
contracts has been the need to establish an accurate 
baseline of existing cost data and a reliable method of 
measuring the degree of improvement over the status quo.  
According to the General Service Administration (GSA), most 
GSA projects reviewed for share-in-savings incentives were 
rejected because agencies could not determine baseline 
costs.24 
 
d. Alpha Contracting   
 
Alpha contracting primarily relies on a team 
approach to concurrently develop a Statement Of Work (SOW), 
negotiate a price and prepare the contract in final form.  
The integrated team is composed of all key stakeholders 
including representatives from the requiring organization, 
contracting, administrative organizations (such as Defense 
Contract Management Agency), audit (Defense Contract Audit 
Agency) and the contractor along with any vital 
subcontractors.  Alpha contracting takes advantage of 
concurrent and integrated, rather than serial processing, 
                     23 DoD 4245.8-H, Value Engineering, March 1986, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Acquisition and Logistics, Historical Background. 
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to reduce acquisition cycle time in the preaward phase.  
Jointly, the team’s effort replaces the traditional 
solicitation and proposal phases of classic acquisition 
management.   
Alpha contracting fosters open and early 
communication between the contractor and Government, a 
mutual understanding of the statement of work, and overall 
Government objectives and priorities.  In addition, there 
is the potential that any collaborative partnership 
developed may enhance future conflict resolution and limit 
subsequent litigation.  Under certain types of acquisitions 
such as sole source, alpha contracting has resulted in 
substantial savings of both time and money.25  
Unfortunately, alpha contracting is also very labor 
intensive early in the acquisition cycle and may be 
difficult to manage for those organizations with limited 
personnel resources.  One alternative for organizations 
with limited staffing requirements is tailoring the 
approach to specific tasks such as SOW generation or 
contract formation.26  
 
D. BARRIERS TO ACQUISITION REFORM 
 
Acquisition Reform: It’s Not As Easy As It Seems 
Mark Cancian27 
 
                     25 Meyer, Thomas C. “Alpha Contracting: Applying the IPT Approach to 
Contract Negotiations”, Army RD&A, January/February 1997, pp. 20-21. 
26 Ibid, 21. 
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Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 1995, pp. 189-198. 
Mr. Cancian, Director, Land Forces Division, Program 
Analysis & Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense, 
succinctly summarizes the DoD’s attempts to effectively 
implement acquisition reform over the last decade.  The 
complexity and difficulty cannot be underestimated 
considering: 
• Resistance to change 
• The physical size and geographical dispersion of 
the acquisition workforce; 
• The diverse composition of occupational 
specialties supporting the acquisition process; 
• The number and influence of the stakeholders 
impacted by DoD acquisition reform initiatives; 
and 
• The number and magnitude of acquisition reforms 
proposed within the last several years. 
 
1. Resistance to Change   
 
A 1997 industry survey of DoD contractors, conducted 
by Coopers and Lybrand, cited cultural resistance as the 
most frequently cited barrier to acquisition reform 
implementation.28  Not surprisingly the same results were 
repeated one year later in a DoD-conducted survey at the 
conclusion of Acquisition Reform Week III.29  Reform 
initiatives are not only slow to gain momentum in an 
organization the size of DoD, they require people to move 
out of their “comfort zones,” challenge organizational 
attitudes and cultures, and threaten personal “rice bowls.” 
                     28 Coopers & Lybrand. “Acquisition Reform Implementation: An Industry 
Survey”, October 1997. 
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Based on past experience, reform initiatives may be 
characterized by the workforce as a passing fad.  As 
exhibited in previous discussions, many initiatives have 
lingered for years without being meaningfully implemented 
or vigorously pursued.  This lackluster performance sends 
the wrong message to the workforce and potentially has the 
tendency to reduce interest in future reform initiatives.  
Successful reform implementation requires “buy-in” at all 
levels of the organization. 
 
2. Size and Geographical Location   
 
The DoD acquisition workforce includes approximately 
135,000 DoD civilians and uniformed service members 
stationed at thousands of locations throughout the United 
States and around the world.30  Although the advent of the 
computer age, through email and the Internet, has 
dramatically improved communication within the acquisition 
community, the logistical concerns of reaching out to and 
clearly communicating reform initiatives to a majority of 
the workforce remain challenging. 
 
3. Workforce Composition/Diversity   
 
The contract specialist/purchasing agent occupational 
specialties only comprise approximately 22,000 positions or 
16.6 percent of the overall acquisition workforce31.  The 
                     30 Burman, A. V., Cavallini, N. M. and Harris, K. N. “Identification of the 
Department of Defense Key Acquisition and Technology Workforce”, Jefferson 
Solutions, D.C., September 2000. 
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vast majority of acquisition workforce members provide 
direct or indirect support to the actual process of 
acquiring supplies and services.  Therefore, effective 
acquisition reform implementation must be institutionalized 
not only by contracting personnel, but also by a diverse 
group of (occupational) specialties.  These different 
groups often have competing and contradictory goals that 
influence their interpretation of reform initiatives within 
the same organization.  Engineering personnel strive for 
technically superior solutions while contracting officers 
pursue the best overall value for the Government 
considering technical, instant procurement and life cycle 
cost trade-offs.  However, some consensus is necessary for 
these reform initiatives to be effectively implemented.  
Table 2.3 exhibits the diversity of the acquisition 
workforce membership as defined by the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act of 199132: 
Unfortunately, there is more than one method of 
classifying the number of individuals in the DoD 
acquisition workforce.  Occupational specialties other than 
Program Managers and Contracting Specialists may only be 
temporarily assigned to a position classified within the 
acquisition workforce.  This method categorizes acquisition 
workforce members across all occupational specialties into 
four categories (including uniformed services members)33. 
 
                     32 Ibid. 
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Engineers 36,790  
Contracting 19,078  
Management 15,567  
Business & Industry 11,502  
Computers 9,101   
Admin. & Programs 6,004   
Financial Mgt. 3,970   
Scientists 3,401   
Auditing 3,605   
Math and Statistics 2,411   
Procurement Asst. 1,912   
Purchasing 1,388   
Supply Mgt. 1,830   
Other 3,580   
   Total Civilians 120,139 
   Total Military 14,875  
   Total DoD A&TWF 135,014  
 
Table 2.3. DAWIA Workforce Count (From: Jefferson 
Solutions). 
 
a. Category I Personnel   
 
Category I includes contracting and program 
management personnel performing acquisition-related work 
regardless of where they are located within the DoD.  All 
personnel in these occupations are always counted as part 
of the workforce.  Uniformed service members are not 
counted in this total.  Of the 135,014 included in Table 2-
3, these individuals account for 24,110 personnel or 17.9 






b. Category IIA Personnel   
 
Category IIA includes occupations such as 
engineers or computer scientist and are only counted when 
they are serving in acquisition-related organizations such 
as the Army Material Command.  Of the 135,014 included in 
Table 2-3, these individuals account for 85,454 personnel 
or 43.3 percent of the total DAWIA defined acquisition 
workforce. 
 
c. Category IIB Personnel   
 
Category IIB includes occupational specialties 
such as microbiology and are only counted when they are 
serving in technology related organizations such as the 
Office of Naval Research.  Of the 135,014 included in Table 
2-3, these individuals account for 6,609 personnel or 4.9 
percent of the total DAWIA defined acquisition workforce. 
 
d. Category III Personnel   
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This is a “miscellaneous” category to provide 
flexibility to organizations to add personnel to improve 
the overall accuracy of the count.  This category accounts 
for the military officers assigned to acquisition, 
logistics or technology related organizations.  Enlisted 
personnel are generally not included in the count.  Of the 
135,014 included in Table 2.3, these individuals account 
for 18,841 personnel or 14.0 percent of the total DAWIA 
defined acquisition workforce.  Considering the military 
account for 14,875, the remaining 3,966 individuals (18,841 
– 14,875) are civilians (assuming no enlisted personnel are 
counted. 
 
4. Acquisition Process Stakeholders 
 
Several influential players have a strong interest in 
the defense acquisition process including Congress, the 
defense industry, small business concerns, and the military 
services.  Each sees acquisition reform as an opportunity 
to further serve their own special interests whether it be 
corporate profits, constituent votes or satisfying 
perceived or actual needs of the end user.  Frequently 
these parties’ interests are in direct conflict with the 
intended purpose of acquisition reform.  Trade-offs and 
compromises are a political reality and must be made to 
garner support from powerful special interest groups often 
at the overall expense of establishing and gaining approval 
of the most effective and efficient acquisition reforms.  
Congress greatly influences Federal and DoD acquisition 
policy through various legislative actions and there is no 
evidence they will relinquish control to DoD or any other 
executive department. 
 
5. Number and Magnitude of Acquisition Reforms   
 
The frequency and number of changes in acquisition 
reform has been so significant that in 2000 the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) characterized the resulting 
turbulence as one of nine management challenges facing 
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DoD.34  During the last decade there have been an estimated 
forty major acquisition reform initiatives proposed by the 
DoD and the individual services35.  These reforms have been 
imposed on organizations that are ill equipped to 
effectively manage change – particularly in the Federal 
(DoD) civil service workforce.  Deputy Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition Reform acknowledged this concern in 
a 1999 quote: “The rapid pace of change and re-engineering 
has outstripped employees’ ability to stay abreast of 
acquisition reform and new business practices.”36   
According to research, there is an overall lack of 
consideration regarding the impact on the workforce of the 
turbulence cause by the large number and magnitude of 
reform initiatives37.  This is of particular concern 
considering congressionally mandated acquisition workforce 
reductions that are seemingly motivated by political 
agendas and without regard to actual workload.  
The DoD faces serious barriers to acquisition reform.  
These barriers are internal and external to the DoD.  Some 
major acquisition reform initiatives depend on 
congressional and/or presidential support to push through 
meaningful legislative change.  Although many other issues 
such as socio-economic programs and multi-year funding 
issues significantly hinder acquisition reform initiatives, 
DoD must focus on those internal and external areas where 
                     34 United States General Accounting Office. “Observations on the Department 
of Defense’s FY99 Performance Report and FY01 Performance Plan”, GAO/NSIAD-00-
188R, June 30, 2000. 
35 General Accounting Office. “Best Practices: DoD Training Can Do More to 
Help Weapon System Programs Implement Best Practices”, GAO/NSIAD-99-206, August 
1996. 
36 Ibid, 6. 
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meaningful progress can reasonably be expected.  Of equal 
importance, DoD needs to focus its efforts on a limited 
number of reform initiatives, fully follow through with 
initiatives proposed, and clearly communicate to the 
workforce some “order of priority”.          
 
E. ACQUISITION REFORM TRAINING 
 
Our military and civilian acquisition personnel 
are clearly the key to the success of our reform 
and modernization issues, and I am strongly 
committed to providing them with the tools they 
will need to meet future challenges. 
 - J.S.Gansler38 
 
Secretary Gansler’s 1998 memorandum recognized the 
importance of training in the successful implementation of 
acquisition reform initiatives.  The purpose of this 
section will be to briefly discuss the sources and types of 
acquisition reform training available to DoD acquisition 
workforce members.  The primary sources providing training 
to support implementation of acquisition reform include the 
Defense Acquisition University, Acquisition Reform 
Advocates, DoD Road Shows, Acquisition Reform Weeks and 
various Non-Government Sources.  Advantages and 
disadvantages of each source will be discussed as 
applicable in Chapter IV, Survey Data and Analysis. 
Acquisition Workforce training has been dictated by 
policy resulting from two specific initiatives.  The first 
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policy resulted from the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990 as previously discussed.  
The second is the Undersecretary of Defense Continuous 
Learning Policy implemented 15 Dec 199839.   
The purpose of the Continuous Learning Policy is to 
provide continued professional growth and development of 
the acquisition workforce including staying current with 
appropriate acquisition reform initiatives.  The continuous 
learning policy requires acquisition workforce members to 
earn a minimum of 80 Continuous Learning Points every two 
years40.  These Continuous Learning Points may be earned 
through participation in Functional/Technical training, 
Leadership Training, Academic Courses at Institutions of 
Higher Education, Developmental Assignments and 
Professional Activities. 
 
1. Defense Acquisition University  
 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) is the 
primary source of training to the DoD acquisition 
workforce.  DAU currently offers eighty-five acquisition 
courses supporting certification in eleven defense 
acquisition career fields41.  These courses are offered in 
residence at one of twelve campuses and regional training 
sites, on-site (in person at the organization’s work site), 
web based and a hybrid of resident and web based.  DAU’s 
primary method of providing acquisition reform training is 
                     39 Ibid, 14. 
40 Ibid, 14. 
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through insertion of “drop in” modules in the eighty-five 
certification courses and the Internet-based Continuous 
Learning Center42.  In addition, DAU offers one specific 
acquisition reform resident/on-site course, Contemporary 
Approaches to Acquisition Reform (CAR) 805, scheduled six 
times during FY2002. 
The purpose of DAU’s Continuous Learning Center (CLC) 
is to augment acquisition training standards for career 
field certification, provide DoD Acquisition Workforce 
members training to implement current acquisition reform 
initiatives, and meet DoD continuing certification 
requirements.  As of 15 Feb 2002, DAU’s CLC had 33 
operational modules serving approximately 2,400 registered 
users43.  Review of the 10 Contracting and 12 Program 
Management courses offered through the CLC indicated course 
formats could be divided into three categories: 
• Courses directly linked back to regular DAU web-
based courses and requiring DAU access privileges 
• Courses that were copies of recent Acquisition 
and Logistics Excellence Week Training Modules 
(slide shows) 
• Courses brief in nature explaining subject 
fundamentals, definitions and regulatory 
references 
DAU’s greatest potential to provide timely acquisition 
reform training to the workforce is through their 
distributed-learning courses.  These courses are thoroughly 
developed, interactive in nature utilizing current 
technology and have an evaluative component-focusing 
                     42 Defense Acquisition Continuous Learning Center. On-line, 
http://clc.dau.mil/kc/main/. 
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student’s attention on specific learning objectives.  
Equally important, these courses have proven to reach a 
relatively large portion of the workforce.  The enrollment 
in these courses has increased from 630 students in 1998 to 
12,800 in 200144.  This trend will continue to rapidly 
increase considering 11 courses were offered on line in 
2001 and 13 more will be added in 200245. 
Although the DAU was originally established in 1991, 
their ability to effectively integrate education and 
training into the DoD acquisition workforce came seven 
years later in 1998 with the consolidation of the service 
acquisition schools.  Until this time, training provided 
across services was not consistently managed.  Considering 
long-standing inter-service rivalries and reluctance to 
yield control over service unique processes and 
philosophies, this should have come as no surprise.  The 
revised DAU structure is still evolving and has received 
criticism from the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
particularly in the DAU’s ability to support acquisition 
reform initiatives: 
While the proposed structure offers improvements, 
it does not discernibly address key weaknesses in 
the training of best (commercial) practices.46   
The same GAO report expresses concern regarding the 
ability of the DoD’s continuous learning policy to direct 
training in any specific acquisition reform initiative.  
After reviewing the DoD continuous learning policy and 
                     44 Defense Acquisition University. “The DAU Road Map for e-Learning and 
Performance Support”, On-Line: 
http://www.dau.mil/pubs/misc/Technology_Roadmap.pdf, dated 27 Aug 2001.  
45 Ibid, 22. 
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considering the range of options for satisfying the annual 
40-hour continuous learning policy, there appear to be no 
checks and balances in place to ensure that training 
supporting current acquisition reform initiatives are 
received. 
 
2. Acquisition Reform Advocates, Roadshows and 
Acquisition Reform Week  
 
DoD and the individual services have used a 
combination of vehicles other than traditional training 
methods and approaches to provide timely training of 
current acquisition reform initiatives to the acquisition 
workforce.  The first of these methods (Roadshows) have 
focused on sending subject matter expert teams to conduct 
on-site seminars, especially to areas with high 
concentrations of acquisition workforce members.  The 
frequency of these on-site seminars appears to be currently 
on the decline in favor of video and web based delivery of 
subject materials, enabling greater participation at a 
lower cost.   
The Acquisition and Logistics Excellence week training 
materials previously discussed and presented via video 
teleconferencing or over the Internet appear to represent 
the future.  These training materials can be accessed at 
the member’s discretion on a “just-in-time” basis.  DAU 
projects the number of Distance Learning courses provided 
over the Internet to rapidly increase and is a trend 
consistent with those at public and private universities 
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and other nongovernmental training sources47.  
Unfortunately, many of these training sources have provided 
workforce members with only a general awareness of current 
reform initiatives and lack detailed information necessary 
to support functional execution.48 
 
3. Non-Government Sources   
 
Non-government sources of training such as 
professional organizations and public and private 
universities have proven to be a valuable source of 
acquisition training to the DoD acquisition workforce.  
Universities and professional organizations attract and 
develop leaders in the public and private acquisition 
communities.  In many cases, these organizations, through 
lobbying efforts, frequently are involved in shaping 
acquisition legislation that ultimately translates into 
acquisition policy and reform initiatives.   
The National Contract Management Association (NCMA), 
the Institute for Supply Management (ISM) and other similar 
organizations provide a variety of acquisition related 
courses to Government and non-government acquisition 
personnel.  These courses are provided through various 
types of seminars and instructor-led and self-paced web-
based formats.  DoD has long recognized the value of career 
development opportunities and certifications offered by 
professional organizations in the contracting career field.  
In 2001, the OSD(AR) requested ISM and NCMA to develop two 
                     47 Ibid, 27. 
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48 Ibid, 17, p. 58. 
training courses (Integrating Commercial Practices through 
Government Business Practices and Performance Based Service 
Acquisition (PBSA)) supporting these two high priority 
acquisition reform initiatives. 
 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter provided a discussion of recent 
acquisition reform initiatives and training sources 
available to DoD acquisition workforce personnel.  
Acquisition reform has been driven by DoD’s recognition 
that best commercial practices offer substantial 
opportunities to improve existing acquisition processes.  
Significant acquisition reform initiatives have been 
codified into public law through important legislative 
acts.  These acts include the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990, the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining (FASA) of 1994, the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 
and the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act of 
1998.  In addition to legislative acts, DoD has promulgated 
regulations and policies supporting numerous acquisition 
reform initiatives. 
The importance of acquisition workforce training has 
significantly increased considering the magnitude and pace 
of acquisition reforms proposed during the last decade.  
DoD training sources have been forced to evolve to meet 
changing priorities that effect both workforce training 
needs and organizations’ resource constraints.  Meeting 
these priorities has and will continue to challenge DoD’s 
education and training institutions.  Traditional training 
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methods are giving way to those provided via maturing 








Chapter II provided an overview of acquisition reform 
initiatives since 1990 and potential sources of acquisition 
reform training available to the Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition workforce.  In this chapter, survey 
development and methodology is presented.  The purpose of 
the survey was to study the acquisition workforce’s 
perception of available training in support of acquisition 
reform implementation.  The data gathered from the survey 
provide the foundation of this research.  Survey data 
presentation and analysis are discussed in Chapter IV. 
 




The survey was formulated after a thorough literature 
review was conducted.  This review indicated that most 
significant acquisition reform was proposed after 1990.  
Therefore, the research survey content was limited to 
initiatives and training resources proposed or implemented 
after 1990.  The online survey, conducted from December 10 
to December 19, 2001, utilized the SurveySaid software and 
was coordinated with the Naval Postgraduate School Office 
of Strategic Planning, Education Assessment and 
Institutional Research. 
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The survey was initially intended to be widely 
distributed to Army and Navy contracting offices within the 
United States.  Unfortunately, due to multiple layers 
within various commands, the survey did not reach some 
potential Navy respondents until after the scheduled cut-
off date.  The communication error was not discovered until 
after the survey had closed and a significant amount of the 
data analysis had been completed.  The survey request was 
successfully distributed to several Army contracting 
organizations providing 411 total responses.  The potential 
number of respondents receiving the survey is unknown.  The 
survey in its online form and accompanying survey cover 
sheet provided to respondents are included in their 
entirety in Appendix A.  
 
2. Framing Survey Questions 
 
The first concern in developing the survey was to keep 
the survey short enough so respondents could answer all 
questions within 10 minutes.  Anything longer might lose 
the respondents’ attention and decrease the number of 
responses.  Prior to publication, the final version of the 
survey was provided to three Naval Postgraduate School 
students and two current acquisition workforce members to 
estimate the average time to complete the survey.  Although 
the survey contains 36 questions, the average completion 
time was eight minutes with no respondent taking over ten 
minutes.  These tests responses are not recorded as part of 
the final survey results. 
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Survey questions were formulated within survey 
software constraints and the research objectives.  The 
decision as to which reform initiatives and training 
sources to include in the survey was based on the 
literature review and the need to meet the practical survey 
constraints previously discussed. 
The structure of survey questions was formulated 
around the constraints of the SurveySaid software utilized 
in the research survey.  SurveySaid provides various 
options to structure survey questions.  Survey questions 
were formatted with the intent of facilitating respondent’s 
understanding of the question and providing data in a 
useful format considering research objectives.  The ability 
to analyze the data was partially constrained by the tools 
provided in the SurveySaid software.  Some of the data 
analysis was accomplished by extracting raw data from the 
SurveySaid software and manually inputting it into 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.  The analysis relied on 
descriptive statistics including numerical means and 
response frequencies. 
 
3. Purpose of Questions 
 
The purpose of the first five questions was to gather 
demographic information about survey respondents.  The 
remaining 31 questions pertain to acquisition reform 
training.  The following provides the underlying rationale 
for each question.  Because of software constraints in 
yielding data output, three of the original survey 
questions were divided into several questions.  The first 
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question was divided into eleven separate questions (7 
through 17).  The other two questions were each divided 
into eight separate questions (18 through 25 and 26 through 
33).  The purpose of the three original questions will be 
discussed collectively. 
 
a. Question 1 
 
Question:  I am (select only one): 
 
• Civilian 
• Active Duty Military 
 
The amount of training and education provided by 
DoD to the military member of the acquisition workforce is 
considerably higher when compared to their civilian 
counterpart49.  Therefore, the researcher anticipated 
military and civilian member’s survey responses may differ. 
 
b. Question 2 
 
Question:  Please indicate your Primary 
Occupational Career Field or military equivalent (select 
only one): 
 
• Engineers (all) 
• Contracting 
• Program Management 
• Business and Industry 
• Information Technology 
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49 Disney, Diane. “Investing in People: Educating the Civilian Workforce”, 
The Armed Forces Comptroller, Summer 2000, Vol. 45, Issue 2, pp. 61-65. 
• Administration and Programs 
• Scientist 
• Auditing 
• Financial Management 
• Procurement Assistants 
• Mathematics and Statistics 
• Purchasing 
• Supply Management 
• Inventory Management 
• Equipment Specialists 
• General Supply 
• Miscellaneous 
 
The DoD acquisition workforce as defined by the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 
1990 includes a diverse group of career fields.  For 
research purposes, the respondent’s career field may 
provide insight into their perspective on acquisition 
reform training provided. 
 
c. Question 3 
 
Question:  What is the highest DAWIA 
certification level you have attained in your Primary 
Career Field (select only one)? 
 
• Level I 
• Level II 
• Level III 
• No certification 
 
As discussed in Chapter II, DAWIA certification 
levels are directly associated with mandatory training 
standards.  DAWIA certifications levels may correlate with 
implementation of acquisition reform initiatives. 
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d. Question 4 
 
Question:  Number of years at Highest DAWIA 
Certification Level (select only one): 
 
• 1-2 years 
• 3-4 years 
• 5-6 years 
• 7-8 years 
• 9-10 years 
 
The number of years at highest certification may 
be significant in the event a substantial portion of the 
workforce has fulfilled DAWIA level III requirements.  
After DAWIA certification, there may be reduced incentive 
to actively seek out additional training.  This factor may 
impact reform implementation considering acquisition reform 
initiatives are constantly evolving.  The available choices 
were limited between one and ten years since DAWIA 
certification started in 1991 and therefore, as of 2001, 
there should not be anyone certified over 10 years. 
 
e. Question 5 
 
Question:  I work in a (select only one): 
 
• Program Management Office (ACAT I, II, or III 
designation) 
• Major Systems Command or equivalent 
• Inventory Control Point (Service or DLA) 
• Base/Installation Level Contracting Office 
• Contract Policy/Administrative Support Office 
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The acquisition workforce is employed acquiring 
an extremely diverse group of products and services.  As a 
result, acquisition organizations’ missions differ 
substantially.  Depending on the type of organization, a 
workforce member’s perspective/interest on any specific 
type of acquisition reform initiative may vary. 
 
f. Question 6 
 
Question:  Which of the following Acquisition 
Reform initiatives have you been involved in implementing 
(select all that apply)?  
 
• Evolutionary or Incremental Acquisition 
Development Strategy 
• Incentive-Term Contracting 
• Share-in-Savings Contracts 
• Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
• Performance Based Contract Payments 
• Alpha Contracting 
• Performance Based Contracts 
• Outsourcing (A-76, Fair Act, etc.) 
• Commercial Items and Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures 
• Integrated Process Teams 
• Past Performance Evaluation 
 
The purpose of this survey question is to 
determine if the respondent has been involved in 
implementing any or all of the target acquisition reform 
initiatives.  Respondents’ responses were limited to yes or 
no.  According to research, some of the acquisition reform 
training provided by DoD has only accomplished initiative 
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awareness50.  The distinction between awareness and actual 
implementation is important.     
The eleven selected initiatives are among dozens 
(perhaps hundreds) proposed since 1990.  These initiatives 
were selected with two objectives.  The first was to select 
a reasonable number of initiatives that potentially have 
broad application across various acquisition groups 
considering the significant mission diversity in DoD.  As 
discussed, a primary concern was also not to make the 
survey so time consuming that a respondent would not 
participate while still gather meaningful data supporting 
the research objectives.  There was no expectation all 
selected initiatives would apply to all workforce members.  
The second objective in selecting the initiatives 
was to provide a basis for examining DOD’s success 
implementing select acquisition reform initiatives over a 
period of time.  The first seven are select initiatives 
from the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & 
Technology) memorandum dated 29 Nov 0051.  These initiatives 
are reflective of current reform priorities within the DoD 
acquisition community.  Some of these seven initiatives are 
“re-runs” from previous legislative initiatives (FASA, 
Clinger-Cohen) that are several years old.  Including these 
“re-runs” in the survey may provide some correlation 
between the success (or lack thereof) of implementing these 
initiatives and acquisition reform training.   
The eighth initiative, outsourcing (of in-house 
service contracts), has gained particular prominence since 
                     50 Ibid, 34. 
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enactment of the Fair Act in 1998 and, as previously 
discussed in Chapter II, the increasing importance of 
service contracting.  
The last three initiatives were key elements of 
FASA and as such have been available as tools to the 
acquisition workforce for several years and are applicable 
to a substantial percentage of the workforce.  Including 
these three initiatives should provide a basis for 
analyzing the success of implementing acquisition reform 
across the workforce. 
 
g. Question 7 through 17 
 
The purpose of these eleven questions was to 
identify the source(s) of training a respondent received 
for each individual acquisition reform initiative 
previously identified.  Each question permitted multiple 
choices.  The acquisition reform initiatives are the same 
as those identified in Question 6.  The selection of 
available training sources was based on the literature 
review conducted and includes the majority of sources 
available to DoD acquisition workforce members.  This 
section of the survey started with the basic question seven 
and was followed by the eleven sub-questions addressing 
each of the eleven reform initiatives.  As an example: 
For the following Acquisition Reform Initiatives, 
please indicate (if any) the Sources of Training you have 
received for each initiative: 
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7.  Evolutionary or Incremental Acquisition 
Development Strategy (select all that apply): 
 
• DAU Resident Courses 
• DOD “Road Shows” 
• Acquisition Reform Week 
• DAU Web-Based Courses 
• In-House Acquisition Reform Advocates 
• Government Funded Education (Naval Postgraduate 
School, Air Force Institute of Technology, etc.) 
• Non-Gov’t Sources 
• No Training Received 
  
All eleven questions can be viewed at Appendix A. 
 
h. Questions 18 through 25 
 
The purpose of questions 18 through 25 was to 
gather qualitative data from respondents regarding “most 
effective” acquisition reform training from a single 
source.  Lead Question 18, ask the respondent “Of the 
Acquisition Reform Initiatives you have been involved in 
implementing (if any), which training source provided you 
with the MOST EFFECTIVE acquisition reform training” 
Questions 19 through 23 were selected based on elements of 
effective acquisition reform training identified during the 
literature review: 
• Adequacy of training to support functional 
implementation 
• Dissemination of information to create mutual 
understanding 
• Follow-up support and refresher training 
• Applicability of training to targeted to specific 
responsibilities 
• Timeliness of training 
Questions 24 and 25 provide the respondent an 
opportunity to state other reasons for effective training 
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for the source specified and rate the alternate source 
identified by the respondent, respectively. 
The questions were originally constructed to 
permit the respondent to rate the question on a sliding 
continuum corresponding to scale ratings from 1 to 10, with 
an adjective rating of “Inadequate” to “Excellent”, 
respectively.  The center of the scale indicated a rating 
of “Average – 5”.  Due to software constraints the sliding 
continuum was converted to 24 possible linear choices (see 
Appendix A for specific question layout).  The numerical 
scale and adjectival rating anchors remained unchanged. 
 
i. Questions 26 through 33 
 
The rationale, framing, and physical structure of 
questions 26 through 33 were identical to questions 18 
through 25, only the purpose of the questions was to 
examine “least effective” training sources.  The researcher 
postulated the same training elements supporting effective 
acquisition reform implementation could apply equally as 
barriers to implementation when inadequate training was 
provided.  The researcher anticipated responses from these 
two sets of questions (18 through 25 and 26 through 33) 
might provide a basis for comparing and contrasting 






j. Question 34 
 
Question:  Overall, to what extent do you feel 
that the training you have received has contributed to 
preparing you to Implement Acquisition Reform Initiatives? 
The purpose of this question was to provide the 
respondent with the opportunity to summarize their 
perception of training provided.  The question also 
provided the researcher a method of generally validating 
survey responses.  This question used the same rating 
methodology as Questions 18 through 34 except the adjective 
ratings were changed to correlate with the questions being 
asked.  Scale ratings of 1 and 10, respectively, 
corresponded with adjective ratings of “Not at All” and 
“Greatly”.  The center of the scale (5) indicated a rating 
of “Somewhat”.   
 
k. Question 35 
 
Question:  Has your workload/schedule prevented 
you from participating in Acquisition Reform Training 







According to the literature review, the ability 
of the acquisition workforce to obtain necessary training 
may be related to work schedule demands.  This question 
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provides a method of evaluating this concern.  Responses 
may also support DoD’s increasing focus on Distance 
Learning and web-based courses as a means to mitigate work 
schedule conflicts. 
 
l. Question 36 
 
Question:  Please provide other comments 
regarding the value of Acquisition Reform Training 
received. 
The researcher recognized the limited scope of 
the survey.  As such, there may be specific workforce 
concerns that were missed in the literature review and not 
included in the survey.  The final question provides 
respondents an opportunity to express those concerns and/or 
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IV. SURVEY DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the 
acquisition workforce survey conducted in support of the 
subject thesis research.  The data presented generally 
follows the order of questions included in the survey (See 
Appendix A).  Cross-comparison of responses between two 
questions are provided as appropriate.  For purposes of 
data analysis, the survey questions have been divided into 
the following five areas: 
• Respondent Demographic Information (Questions one 
through five) 
• Respondents’ Training Received and Acquisition 
Reform Implementation (Questions six through 
seventeen) 
• Respondents’ Single Source of Most Effective 
Training (Questions 18 through 25) 
• Respondents’ Single Source of Least Effective 
Training (Questions 26 through 33) 
• Respondents’ General Perception of DoD Provided 
Training Supporting Implementation of Acquisition 
Reform (Questions 34 through 36) 
As discussed in Chapter III, Survey Methodology, the 
survey did not reach a significant portion of the intended 
Department of Navy (DoN) audience.  Although no survey data 
was gathered identifying the respondent’s service branch, 
the researcher postulates that a majority of the 
respondents are employed by the Department of the Army 
based on the survey distribution.  The concentration of 
Department of Army respondents should be considered in any 
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attempt to generalize findings to other Department of 
Defense (DoD)/Service acquisition workforce groups.    
The statistical data as extracted from the SurveySaid 
software package utilized to conduct the survey is included 
at Appendix C.  The total number of individuals responding 
to the web-based survey was 411.  Unless otherwise stated, 
the statistical data presented and analyzed is based on the 
total number of individuals responding to a specific 
question.  All tables presented in this chapter were 
prepared by the researcher based on the data obtained from 
the survey.  Minor discrepancies between tables created by 
the researcher and raw statistical data provided in the 
SurveySaid software output is subject to insignificant 
rounding errors.  Any further explanation for such rounding 
errors is omitted. 
 
B. RESPONDENTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
1. Uniformed Service Members 
 
The total number of military members responding to 
survey question one was 31 of 411 or 7.54% which is 
consistent with the actual DoD workforce composition 
(11.02%) as discussed in Chapter II, Figure 2.3, DAWIA 
Workforce Count by Occupation.  Cross-comparison of other 
survey questions did not indicate any noteworthy 
differences between civilian and military acquisition 
workforce members.  Thus, all findings presented below 




2. Occupational Career Field 
 
As exhibited in Table 4.1, the survey respondents’ 
career field is heavily concentrated in the Contracting 
area.  Of the remaining fifteen potential career field 
choices (plus one miscellaneous “catch-all” category), only 
three others had any meaningful response rate.  Three of 
the 411 respondents failed to identify their career field. 
 
Percent of 
Career Field Frequency Total Responses
Contracting 337 82.60%
Engineering 17 4.17%
Administration & 13 3.19%
   Programs
Program Management 10 2.45%
   Totals: 377 92.40%
Total Responses: 408  
 
Table 4.1. Respondent’s Occupational Career Field. 
 
The response to survey question two is not in 
proportion to the distribution of occupational career 
fields within the acquisition workforce as previously 
discussed in Chapter II, Literature Review, Table 2.3.  
Although the response is heavily distorted, Contracting 
careerist do comprise a large majority of those individuals 
permanently classified as acquisition workforce members.  
Many of the other occupational specialties may only be 
temporarily assigned to a position classified within the 
acquisition workforce.  This conclusion is supported by a 
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related method of categorizing acquisition workforce 
members discussed in Chapter II. 
Although contracting should logically be the nucleus 
for acquisition reform, many other professions play 
significant roles and therefore, also require access to 
effective acquisition reform training.  Unfortunately, the 
limited response from respondents classified outside the 
Contracting career field may provide a distorted view when 
examining the effectiveness of implementing some 
acquisition reform initiatives.  This is especially true in 
situations requiring organization-wide support to 
effectively implement acquisition reform initiatives.   
 
3. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) Certification Level 
 
Responses to survey questions 3 and 4 are consolidated 
into Table 4.2, Respondent’s DAWIA Certification Level.  
This table cross-compares the respondents’ highest DAWIA 
certification level (question 3) with the respondents’ 
number of years at the highest certification level 








Certification Level Level I Level II Level III Total
1-2 Years 16 22 60 98
3-4 Years 3 18 48 69
5-6 Years 0 25 44 69
7-8 Years 0 35 26 61
9-10 Years 2 32 54 88
   Totals: 21 132 232 385
Percent of
   Total Responses: 5.45% 34.29% 60.26% 100.00%
Average Years
   at Certification Level: 2.5 6.1 5.2 5.4
Years Years Years Years




Table 4.2. Respondents’ DAWIA Certification Level. 
 
The majority (94.55%) of the survey respondents are 
certified at the journeyman (Level II) or senior (Level 
III) DAWIA levels and on average, have been certified at 
these levels for at least five years.  These data indicate 
the vast majority of acquisition workforce members 
responding to the survey have met all mandatory acquisition 
training to satisfy DAWIA requirements for their current 
positions for some time.  Within Level II and III, there is 
a relatively even distribution of respondents between the 
number of years certified at the highest level. 
Notwithstanding the establishment of continuous 
learning education requirements by Under Secretary of 
Defense Gansler in December 1998, these figures suggest 
that a significant portion of the acquisition workforce may 
not have received any formal training in the last several 
years.  This is indicated by the average number of years 
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(five or greater) spent at the highest DAWIA certification 
level.  Resources to support formal training after 
mandatory DAWIA certification are scarce and may adversely 
impact the ability of DoD to provide adequate training to 
support acquisition reform. 
 
4. Employment Site 
 
Responses to survey question 5 identifying 
respondents’ employment site are summarized in Table 4.3.  
The lack of Inventory Control Point responses is directly 
attributed to the late distribution of the survey to DoN 




Site Frequency Total Responses
Major Systems Command 157 39.25%
Contract Policy/
   Admin Support Office 123 30.75%
Base/Installation
   Level Office 96 24.00%
Program Management
   Office 20 5.00%
Inventory Control Point 4 1.00%
Total: 400 100.00%
Missing Responses: 11  
 
Table 4.3. Respondent’s Employment Site. 
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With the exception of Program Management Offices, the 
distribution of respondents among employment sites provides 
a cross-section of acquisition workforce task 
responsibilities throughout DoD.  
 
C. RESPONDENTS’ TRAINING RECEIVED AND ACQUISITION REFORM 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Table 4.4 provides a summary of acquisition reform 
training received by respondents for each target initiative 
and the rate of the degree of engagement in implementation 
for each acquisition reform initiative.  Participants had 
the opportunity to select more than one initiative and 
training source. 
 
Received Implemented Implementation Missing
Initiative Training Initiative Rate Response
Evolutionary 54.83% 7.55% 13.77% 14.36%
Incentive-Term 43.28% 15.89% 36.71% 18.49%
Share-in-Savings 20.78% 4.69% 22.57% 25.06%
ADR 63.56% 23.96% 37.70% 16.55%
Perform Based
  Contract Payments 59.48% 30.73% 51.66% 15.33%
Alpha Contracting 52.91% 43.49% 82.20% 16.30%
Performance Based
  Contracts 79.47% 58.59% 73.73% 8.76%
Outsourcing 43.81% 18.75% 42.80% 19.46%
Commercial Item/SAP 83.55% 69.01% 82.60% 6.81%
IPT 73.35% 63.28% 86.27% 11.44%
Past Performance
  Evaluation 72.46% 70.05% 96.67% 9.00%  
 
Table 4.4. Respondent’s Acquisition Reform 
Training/Implementation Rates. 
 
The percent of respondents receiving acquisition 
reform training for each initiative and the “missing 
responses” category are based on the total number of 
responses received for the corresponding survey questions, 
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seven through seventeen.  The percent of respondents 
implementing a specific reform initiative is based on 
responses to survey question six.  The implementation rate 
was calculated by dividing the Implemented Initiative 
percent by the Received Training percent (i.e., for 
evolutionary contracting strategy, 7.55%/54.83% = 13.77%).  
At best, the implementation rates presented in Table 4.4 
assume all respondents receiving training followed through 
with reform implementation, which is unlikely.  In this 
case, the assumption has the effect of possibly over- 
stating survey respondents’ actual implementation rates. 
The implementation rate analysis does not account for 
those individuals not provided with the opportunity to 
implement any single reform initiative for which training 
was received.  Regardless, the researcher made a reasonable 
assumption that the survey respondents did not participate 
in training without the expectation of practical 
application within assigned duties.  Further, acquisition 
management personnel are required to plan and approve 
acquisition workforce personnel training through the 
Individual Development Plan (IDP) process on an annual 
basis.  During this review process any training not 
applicable to an individual’s duties would most likely be 
disapproved and thereby prevent attendance to unnecessary 
training.  The following two paragraphs discuss in detail 






1. Training Received 
 
The training received by survey respondents from three 
employment sites (Major Systems Commands, Policy/Support 
Offices, and Base/Installation Level Activities) 
constituting the majority (94%, See Table 4.3, Respondent’s 
Employment Site) of the respondents is summarized in Table 
4.5.  The “All Employment Sites” column in this table 
includes responses from all five possible employments 
included in the survey. 
 
Major Systems Base/Installation Policy/Admin All Employment
Initiative Command Level Activity Activity Sites
Evolutionary 51.85% 54.76% 55.88% 54.83%
Incentive-Term 44.19% 49.37% 36.73% 43.28%
Share-in-Savings 17.65% 26.03% 20.00% 20.78%
ADR 62.60% 54.55% 70.48% 63.56%
Performance Based
  Contract Payments 60.74% 55.84% 60.00% 59.48%
Alpha Contracting 63.50% 46.15% 43.56% 52.91%
Performance Based
  Contracts 81.25% 86.36% 70.27% 79.47%
Outsourcing 40.00% 49.38% 41.67% 43.81%
Commercial Item/SAP 86.30% 91.21% 76.52% 83.55%
IPT 74.31% 62.96% 76.85% 73.35%
Past Performance




Table 4.5. Acquisition Reform Training Received by 
Employment Site. 
 
The percent of training received for any single 
acquisition reform initiative varied by employment site.  
Part of this variance can be attributed to the workforce 
member’s employment site that is closely matched with their 
specific work responsibilities and corresponding applicable 
  67
acquisition reform initiatives.  As discussed in Chapter 
II, Literature Review, reform initiatives such as an 
evolutionary contracting strategy, predominately apply to 
the acquisition of major weapon systems and those 
activities managing such programs.  Therefore, there is no 
reasonable expectation that Base/Installation Level 
Contracting Office personnel, comprising 24 percent of the 
survey respondents, would demand or benefit from this type 
of training.  Unfortunately, according to Table 4.5, survey 
respondents indicated that more evolutionary training was 
received by Base/Installation Level Personnel (54.76%) than 
by Major Systems Commands (51.85%).  If this trend is 
consistent throughout the acquisition workforce, the method 
of prioritizing or rationing of training resources may need 
to be scrutinized. 
As previously discussed in Chapter III, Survey 
Methodology, some initiatives were selected specifically 
because of their potential application to all acquisition 
workforce members.  These include incentive term 
contracting, share-in-savings, commercial items/simplified 
acquisition procedures (SAP) and past performance 
evaluation.  Of these four initiatives, only commercial 
items/SAP and past performance evaluation training was 
received by a substantial number of the respondents, 83.55 
percent and 72.46 percent, respectively.  In contrast, and 
contrary to expectations, the percentage across all sites 
receiving training in incentive term and share-in-savings 
contracting initiatives was only 43.28 percent and 20.78 
percent, respectively.   
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Again, the employment site that closely correlates 
with a respondent’s work responsibilities influences the 
overall level of training received for any one initiative.  
Considering past performance evaluation is mandatory for 
all procurements in excess of $100,000.00, the 79.17%, 
71.91% and 64.55% percent rate of training for respondents 
from Major Systems Commands, Base/Installation Level 
Activities, and Policy/Administrative Activities, 
respectively, is inadequate.  This level of training 
received supporting past performance evaluation is 
unexpected since 94.55 percent (See Table 4.2) of the 
survey respondents are journeyman or senior contract 
personnel responsible for acquisitions above the mandatory 
past performance evaluation level of $100,000.  Thus, the 
expected level of past performance training received should 
have exceeded 94.55 percent.  
 
2. Acquisition Reform Implementation 
 
The frequency of acquisition reform initiatives 
implemented, as exhibited in implementation rates, also 
varies by location.  The variation in the extent to which 
training ultimately leads to initiative implementation may 
be attributed to at least three possible situations.   
First, training is being provided to those individuals 
who do not require the subject training and resources are 
being wasted.  In this case, management is not providing 
adequate oversight during the IDP review and approval 
process as previously discussed.   
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Second, the training is reaching the appropriate 
audience and due to resistance to change, the training is 
being disregarded.  This implementation barrier may be 
attributed to the individual or lack of leadership support.  
Prior DoD sponsored surveys have cited resistance to change 
as the number one barrier to improving the acquisition 
process and implementing meaningful acquisition reform52.  
Although the researcher recognizes changing the culture 
within DoD is critical to the overall success of 
implementing any proposed acquisition reform initiative, an 
exhaustive discussion of change management is beyond the 
scope of this research.    
The third potential explanation is that training is 
being provided to the appropriate audience but is 
inadequate for the individual to functionally implement the 
subject initiative.  This certainly appears to be the case 
with some initiatives such as the evolutionary contracting 
strategy having a low, 13.77 percent, implementation rate. 
The opportunity (frequency) to implement any single 
initiative may also have a significant bearing on the 
implementation rates presented.  Many individuals 
(especially civilians) may be assigned to a single program 
with a life cycle exceeding ten years.  In these cases, the 
timing within the program cycle may not accommodate 
implementation of reform initiatives regardless of the 
potential benefits.    
Unfortunately, the survey methodology cannot 
distinguish between these three possibilities.  Later in 
this chapter, survey questions nineteen and twenty-seven 
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52 Department of Navy. Acquisition Reform Week III Survey, July 1998 and 
Ibid, 26). 
attempt to address the adequacy of training sources 
supporting functional implementation of acquisition reform.   
Again, like the amount of training received on the 
four broadly applicable initiatives (incentive term 
contracting, share-in-savings, commercial items/SAP and 
past performance evaluation), the implementation rate for 
incentive-term and share-in-savings, appears to be poor 
(36.71% and 22.57%, respectively) based on the survey 
response. 
The actual implementation for any single initiative is 
strongly influenced by the respondent’s duty 
assignment/employment site.  Table 4.6 cross-compares a 
summary of respondents’ employment sites with the frequency 
of individual reform initiative implementation.  The 
implementation percentage for a single initiative per 
employment site is the numerical frequency divided by the 
total number of responses for each employment site (i.e., 
for Major Systems Command/Evolutionary contracting 
strategy: 16/157 = 10.19%).  Responses from Program 
Management Offices and Inventory Control Points were 
insignificant in number (20 and 4, respectively) and 





Evolutionary 16 10.19% 3 3.13% 7 5.69%
Incentive-Term 28 17.83% 12 12.50% 18 14.63%
Share-in-Savings 7 4.46% 3 3.13% 7 5.69%
ADR 37 23.57% 16 16.67% 30 24.39%
Performance Based
  Contract Payments 53 33.76% 15 15.63% 40 32.52%
Alpha Contracting 82 52.23% 28 29.17% 41 33.33%
Performance Based
  Contracts 96 61.15% 52 54.17% 57 46.34%
Outsourcing 30 19.11% 17 17.71% 20 16.26%
Commercial Item/SAP 109 69.43% 76 79.17% 64 52.03%
IPT 110 70.06% 32 33.33% 79 64.23%
Past Performance
  Evaluation 121 77.07% 64 66.67% 64 52.03%










Table 4.6. Acquisition Reform Initiatives Implemented 
by Employment Site. 
 
As exhibited in Table 4.6, reform initiatives such as 
evolutionary contracting strategy (10.19% vs. 3.13%), alpha 
contacting (52.23% vs. 29.17%), and IPTs (70.06% vs. 
33.33%) are more frequently utilized in high dollar, 
complex procurements managed by Major Systems Commands than 
lower dollar value procurements managed by 
Base/Installation Level Activities.  Conversely, Commercial 
Item/Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) are more 
frequently utilized at the Base/Installation Level than in 
Major Systems Command (79.17% vs. 69.43%) due to the 
relatively low task complexity and dollar values.       
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The overall success of a specific training source 
supporting acquisition reform implementation for any single 
initiative can be evaluated by cross comparing survey 
responses to questions six and eighteen.  Question six 
identified the frequency respondents implemented target 
reform initiatives.  Question eighteen requested the survey 
respondent identify the training source perceived to be 
most effective.   
Table 4.7, Most Effective Training Source by 
Initiative, provides a cross-comparison of responses 
between survey questions six and eighteen.  The individual 
percentages are based on the total number of responses for 
each initiative divided by the number of responses for each 
individual initiative.  For example, seven survey 
respondents rated DAU as the most effective source for 
evolutionary training with 29 respondents rating 
evolutionary as most effective across all training sources; 























































Evolutionary (n=29) 24.1% 6.9% 6.9% 0.0% 17.2% 20.7% 24.1%
Incentive-Term (n=59) 23.7% 10.2% 3.4% 1.7% 25.4% 11.9% 23.7%
Share-in-Savings (n=16) 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 31.3% 18.8% 25.0%
ADR (n=89) 21.3% 9.0% 12.4% 4.5% 18.0% 12.4% 22.5%
Performance Based
  Contract Payments (n=110) 25.5% 8.2% 8.2% 3.6% 25.5% 10.9% 18.2%
Alpha Contracting (n=157) 25.5% 7.6% 10.2% 1.3% 30.6% 10.2% 14.6%
Performance Based
  Contracts (n=214) 23.8% 7.5% 7.9% 4.7% 27.6% 9.3% 19.2%
Outsourcing (n=65) 32.3% 4.6% 4.6% 1.5% 16.9% 15.4% 24.6%
Commercial Item/SAP (n=254) 29.1% 6.3% 9.8% 3.5% 26.4% 7.9% 16.9%
IPT (n=230) 22.6% 7.0% 11.7% 1.7% 30.0% 10.9% 16.1%
Past Performance
  Evaluation (n=253) 23.3% 4.7% 10.3% 3.2% 27.7% 12.6% 18.2%
Training Source Totals 367 102 138 43 393 162 271
Most Effective Training Source
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Table 4.7. Most Effective Training Source by 
Initiative. 
Based on cross-comparison of survey questions six and 
eighteen, DAU Resident Courses and In-House Acquisition 
Reform Advocates account for the majority of most effective 
training sources across most initiatives.  Based on 
frequency cited, these two training sources accounted for 
over 50 percent of the most effective training sources.  
Non-Government sources of acquisition reform training were 
also frequently cited in four of the eleven initiatives.  
The remaining four training sources were ranked 
consistently below these three in almost all eleven 
initiatives.     
 
D. RESPONDENTS’ SINGLE SOURCE OF MOST EFFECTIVE TRAINING 
 
Survey questions 18 through 25 provided the 
respondents an opportunity to identify the single most 
effective training source and rate the effectiveness based 
on criteria identified during the literature review as 
being key criterion in supporting successful acquisition 
reform training.  See Appendix A for specific survey 
questions and formats.   
 
1. Training Source Ratings 
 
Comparison between survey respondent’s actual ratings 
between criterion and training sources provides slightly 
different results as indicated in Table 4-8, Most Effective 
Training Source Ratings and Qualitative Criteria.  Ratings 
are based on an average rating of survey responses on a 
possible scale of 1 to 24, with 1 being inadequate and 24 
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being excellent.  Note: Although the survey question scale 
provided three labels, “Inadequate – 1”, “Average – 5” and 
“Excellent – 10”, due to the question format and software 
constraints, the possible choices on the question continuum 
and the actual data output from the SurveySaid software 
ranged from 1 to 24 (See Appendix A for question format).  
Thus, the highest numerical ratings are associated with the 
most effective training sources.  
Table 4.8 presents average ranges of training sources 
each evaluation criterion (questions 19 through 23).  The 
average rating of training criteria was calculated on a 
weighted average basis across all training sources.  It was 
calculated by summing the product of the individual 
training/criteria ratings and the frequency each was cited 
by survey respondents.  
 








































































Functionally Implement 16.5 14.7 12.7 14.2 15.2 17.3 15.4 15.4
Adequate Dissemination
Creating Mututal Understanding 13.7 13.2 13.3 11.8 13.9 13.8 11.8 13.3
Follow-up Support/Training 10.8 8.3 9.8 8.3 12.2 11.4 10.5 10.8
Targeted to Work 15.5 14.8 12.6 13.9 14.8 16.2 13.2 14.6
Provided in Timely Manner 14.1 13.2 11.9 10.6 13.6 15.1 12.9 13.4
Average Training Source Rating 14.12 12.84 12.06 11.76 13.94 14.76 12.76 N/A
No. Respondents/Training Source 475 126 215 65 463 179 299 N/A
Training Source/Average Respondent Rating
 
Table 4.8. Most Effective Training Source Ratings and 
Qualitative Criteria. 
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Based on the results provided in Table 4-8, the most 
highly rated criterion by survey respondents across six of 
seven training sources focused on the adequacy of training 
to support functional implementation of reform initiatives 
(question 19).  The traditional training sources such as 
DAU resident courses and Government funded education were 
perceived to be the most effective in supporting practical 
implementation of acquisition reform initiatives.  On 
average, reform training targeted specifically to a 
respondent’s work responsibilities (question 22) was also 
highly rated as an effective training criterion. 
Government funded education was the most highly rated 
training sources for three of the five criterions included 
in Table 4.8; functional implementation (17.3), targeted to 
work responsibilities (16.2), and provided in a timely 
manner (15.1).   
The remaining two criteria of effectiveness are 
providing adequate dissemination of acquisition reform 
training creating mutual understanding within the 
organization (13.9) and providing follow-up/refresher 
training (12.2).  Ratings indicate that, for these 
criteria, the most effective training was attributed to in-
house reform advocates.  This is consistent with the 
overall frequency (see Table 4.7) showing in-house 
advocates were cited as the “most effective” training 
source by survey respondents.  The physical presence and 
access to these advocates within respondents’ organizations 
logically supports these survey results.  They have the 
ability to provide alternate solutions to time and place 
issues that may constrain other forms of training reviewed.      
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With the exception of in-house advocates, the ability 
to provide follow-up/refresher training supporting 
acquisition reform was the lowest rated criterion across 
all training sources.  The low rating suggests a lag time 
between reform policy implementation and supporting 
training being provided to the acquisition workforce.  This 
lag may be attributed to the rapid pace of change and the 
inability of training providers such as DAU to react in a 
timely manner. 
 
2. Respondent’s Narrative Comments on Training 
Effectiveness 
 
The final two questions of this section examining the 
effectiveness of training sources provided survey 
respondents the opportunity to identify (short “fill-in the 
blank” narrative) and rate their unique reasons for 
training effectiveness, questions 24 and 25, respectively.  
Due to constraints inherent to the utilized SurveySaid 
software and the desire to keep the survey to a reasonable 
size, the individual reasons could not be matched with 
specific respondent ratings.  Therefore, only an average 
rating for all individual reasons is provided.  As with 
survey questions 19 through 23, the average rating is based 
on a possible scale of 1 to 24.   
The researcher categorized the 157 narrative responses 
(question 24) into eleven categories including a single 
miscellaneous category.  Table 4.9 summarizes narrative 
response categories as defined by the researcher and the 
overall average rating associated with those responses.  
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The researcher did not include the 27 negative responses in 
the percent calculations since they did not address the 
purpose of the question – to identify reasons/criterion 
supporting “most” effective training. 
 
Respondent's Most Effective Narrative
Hands On/Lessons Learned 29 22.3%
Quality of Instruction 22 16.9%
Targeted to Responsibilities 19 14.6%
General Awareness 9 6.9%
Access/Refresher Training 9 6.9%
Resident Training 4 3.1%
Leadership Buy-in/Support 4 3.1%
Resource/Tool 4 3.1%
External Source 3 2.3%
Misc. Single Topics 27 20.8%
   Subtotal 130 100.0%
Negative Comments 27
Total 157
Average Rating - All Responses 16.2
Frequency
  
Table 4.9. Respondents’ Most Effective Narratives. 
 
Three of the eleven researcher-defined categories: 
Hands On/Lessons Learned, Quality of Instruction, and 
Target to Work Responsibilities, comprised a majority (53.8 
percent) of the total narrative responses.  Of these three, 
Quality of Instruction and Targeted to Work 
Responsibilities are directly associated with and further 
support the perceived importance of original criterion 
listed in survey questions addressing adequate information 
being provided to functionally implement reform initiatives 
(question 19) and targeted to my work responsibilities 
(question 22).  It is noteworthy that these two criteria 
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received the highest overall average rating (15.4 and 14.6, 
respectively; see Table 4.8).  This demonstrates the value 
of these criteria in assessing training effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, a large number of respondents (27) also 
misunderstood and viewed the question as an opportunity to 
provide negatives comments, which was not the purpose of 
this question.     
The overall average rating for all narrative responses 
of 16.2 exceeds the average criterion ratings summarized in 
Table 4.8.  This result is not entirely unexpected 
considering these are reasons uniquely identified by survey 
respondents and as such, have personnel significance to 
individual respondents.  The number of single topic 
responses (27) also supports the importance and uniqueness 
of individual responses outside the limited bounds of 
potential survey responses contained in survey questions 19 
through 23.  
 
E. RESPONDENTS’ SINGLE SOURCE OF LEAST EFFECTIVE TRAINING 
 
Survey Questions 26 through 32 provided respondents 
the opportunity to identify the single least effective 
training source and rate the effectiveness based on 
criterion identified during the literature review as being 
key elements supporting successful acquisition reform 
training.  The same criteria used to evaluate “most 
effective training sources” (survey questions 19 through 
23) were used in evaluating “least effective training 
sources” (survey questions 27 though 31).   
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1. Training Source Ratings 
 
Comparison between survey respondent’s actual ratings 
between criterion and training sources does provide 
slightly different results as indicated in Table 4-10, 
Least Effective Training Source Ratings and Qualitative 
Criteria.  As with the most effective ratings, ratings are 
based on an average of survey responses on a possible scale 
of 1 to 24, with 1 being inadequate and 24 being excellent.  
Note: Although the survey question scale provided three 
labels, “Inadequate – 1”, “Average – 5” and “Excellent – 
10”, due to the question format and software constraints, 
the possible choices on the question continuum and the 
actual data output from the SurveySaid software ranged from 
1 to 24. (See Appendix A for question format.)  Thus, the 
lowest numerical ratings are associated with the least 
effective training sources.  The average rating of training 
criteria was calculated on a weighted average basis across 
all training sources.  It was calculated by summing the 
product of the individual training source/criteria ratings 












































































Functionally Implement 10.5 8.4 7.2 8.0 8.0 12.8 7.9 8.1
Adequate Dissemination
Creating Mututal Understanding 9.1 9.6 8.1 7.2 7.3 10.0 7.7 8.3
Follow-up Support/Training 8.6 7.1 6.0 6.6 7.5 10.3 7.0 6.8
Targeted to Work 9.5 8.9 7.9 8.5 8.6 5.7 7.6 8.4
Provided in Timely Manner 8.8 9.1 8.6 8.9 9.0 11.0 8.0 8.8
Average Training Source Rating 9.30 8.62 7.56 7.84 8.08 9.96 7.64 N/A
No. Respondents/Training Source 140 369 590 186 185 16 116 N/A
Training Source/Average Respondent Rating
 
 
Table 4.10. Least Effective Training Source Ratings and 
Qualitative Criteria. 
 
Acquisition Reform Week and DAU Web-based acquisition 
reform training are clearly the least effective forms of 
training as perceived by survey respondents.  This is a 
particularly noteworthy finding because Acquisition Reform 
Week was the most frequently cited source of acquisition 
reform training.  Of equal concern, given these survey 
responses, is DoD’s increasing emphasis on the use of web-
based courses to accomplish the majority of the acquisition 
workforce training goals. 
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Less clear are the perceptions of acquisition reform 
training provided by non-government sources and DoD Road 
Shows.  Training provided by Non-Government sources was 
rated nearly as low as Acquisition Reform Week (7.64 vs. 
7.56) but only cited (approximately) as least effective 
only 7.2 percent vs. 36.5 percent, respectively.  Most of 
this variation can be attributed to the large number of 
survey respondents participating in Acquisition Reform Week 
training when compared to Non-Government.  
 
2. Respondent’s Narrative Comments on Training 
Ineffectiveness 
 
The final two questions of this section complete the 
examination of least effective training sources by 
providing survey respondents the opportunity to identify 
(short “fill-in the blank” narrative) and rate their unique 
reasons for training ineffectiveness, questions 32 and 33, 
respectively.  Due to constraints inherent in the 
SurveySaid software and the desire to keep the survey to a 
reasonable size, the individual reasons could not be 
matched with specific respondent ratings.  Therefore, only 
an average rating for all individual reasons is provided.  
As with survey questions 26 through 31, the average rating 
is based on a weighted average of survey responses on a 
possible scale of 1 to 24.   
The researcher categorized the 156 narrative responses 
(question 32) into nine categories including a single 
miscellaneous category.  Table 4.11, Respondents’ Least 
Effective Narratives, summarizes narrative response 
categories as defined by the researcher and the overall 
average rating associated with those responses.  The 
researcher did not include the one positive response in the 
percent calculations since it did not address the purpose 
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of the question – to identify reasons/criterion supporting 
“least” effective training. 
 
Respondent's Least Effective Narrative
Lacks Substance/Poorly Developed 52 33.5%
Lacks Relevance 32 20.6%
Poor Quality of Instruction 16 10.3%
Inadequate Access to Training 13 8.4%
Web Based Training Ineffective 7 4.5%
No Leadership Buy-in 7 4.5%
Work Schedule Conflicts 6 3.9%
Quick Pace of Change 3 1.9%
Misc. Single Topics 19 12.3%
   Subtotal 155 100.0%
Positive Comments 1
Total 156
Average Rating - All Responses 7.8
Frequency
 
Table 4.11. Respondents’ Least Effective Narratives. 
 
 
Similar to the most effective narrative responses, the 
least effective narrative responses generally support the 
results previously presented.  Comments regarding the 
overall lack of substance and poor quality of instruction 
accounting for 43.8% of all least effective narrative 
responses and are consistent with the perceived importance 
by survey respondents of survey question 27, Training 
providing adequate information to functionally implement 
subject reform initiatives.  The second most cited reason 
for least effective training, Lacks Relevance, accounting 
for 20.6% of all narrative responses, is consistent with 
survey question, number 31, Targeted to my work 
responsibilities.   
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Almost all the remaining narrative responses can be 
directly associated with one of the five survey evaluation 
criteria.  Although there were 19 unique, single topic 
narrative responses, there were no unique insights into 
other potential problem training areas impacting 
acquisition reform.   
 
F. RESPONDENT’S GENERAL PERCEPTION OF DOD PROVIDED 
TRAINING SUPPORTING IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION 
REFORM 
 
Survey question 34 provided respondents the 
opportunity to identify their overall impression of how 
training they have received has contributed to preparing 
them for implementing acquisition reform.  The scoring 
methodology was the same as the 1-24 scale (“1” – Not at 
All, “24” Greatly) utilized in survey questions 19 through 
23 and 27 through 31.  Survey question 35 was utilized to 
gauge work/schedule conflicts on training.  The final 
survey question, 36, provided respondents the opportunity 
to comment on other aspects of acquisition reform training 
received. 
Responses to survey question 34 were cross-compared 
with survey question 3, respondents’ DAWIA certification 
levels, and survey question 5, respondent’s employment 
site.  These two comparisons and a summary of the most and 
least effective ratings (see Average Training Source 
Rating, Tables 4.8 and 4.10) are provided in Table 4.12, 




 Number of Average Ratings
Responses (Scale = 1 - 24)
By DAWIA Certification Level
   Level I 20 12.4
   Level II 121 11.4
   Level III 207 12.7
By Employment Site
   Program Management Office 17 10.0
   Major Systems Command 138 12.4
   Inventory Control Point 4 10.8
   Base/Installation Level Activity 90 13.1
   Policy/Admin Support 108 11.4  
 
Table 4.12. Survey Respondents’ Overall Perceptions. 
 
According to the adjectives anchoring the rating scale 
values on survey question 34, the ratings in Table 4.12 
translates into respondents being only “somewhat” satisfied 
with training received in support of acquisition reform.  
There does not appear to be any noteworthy variation among 
survey respondents regardless of employment site or the 
level of DAWIA certification level.  With the exception of 
Program Management Offices and Inventory Control Point 
activities, the variance of ratings from an average 
possible score of 12 is not noteworthy.  Due to the low 
number of responses received, the Program Management 
Offices and Inventory Control Point activities may not 
accurately represent the overall workforce and individual 
comparisons were omitted.   
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Table 4.13, Workload/Schedule Training Conflicts, 
provides a summary of responses to survey question 35 
cross-compared with respondents’ employment site.  
Responses from respondents assigned to program management 
and inventory control point activities are not included due 
to the low number of responses, 20 and 4, respectively. 
More than two-thirds of survey respondents reported 
that workload/schedule conflicts significantly limit their 
participation in necessary training at least on an 
occasional basis.  And for more than 25%, this problem is 
“frequent.”  A survey respondent’s employment site does not 
appear to significantly change the impact 
workload/schedules have on training participation.       
 
Major Systems Base/Installation Policy/Admin All
Command Level Activity Activity Sites
Frequently 30.26% 28.57% 21.85% 26.84%
Occasionally 40.79% 42.86% 36.97% 40.25%
Seldom 21.71% 20.88% 25.21% 23.04%
Never 7.24% 7.69% 15.97% 9.87%
   Totals 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Employment Site
 
Table 4.13 Workload/Schedule Training Conflicts. 
 
Approximately 70% of the 149 narrative responses from 
survey question 36 are repeat comments from the open-ended 
least and most effective narrative survey questions, 24 and 
32, respectively.  Of the remaining 30 percent, the 
following is a consolidation of other noteworthy comments 
provided by survey respondents. 
 
• Acquisition reform training has added more 
workload 
• DoD has not budgeted adequate funding to provide 
appropriate training for all personnel 
• The number of acquisition reform changes needs to 
be reduced 
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• Training is inappropriately scheduled at fiscal 
year end preventing attendance 
• The best training method is on-the-job training 
(OJT) 
• Staff reductions are impacting the ability of the 
workforce to keep current with new changes 
• DoD needs to provide more web sites specific to 
support acquisition reform topics 
• DoD does not evaluate the effectiveness of 
acquisition reform training provided 
• Too much emphasis is placed on DAWIA 
certification levels, no link to practical 
applications 
• Training budgets are being spent to support 
mandatory DAWIA certification training at the 




This chapter presented and discussed the results of 
the Acquisition Workforce survey that was conducted by the 
author in support of the subject research.  The primary 
focus was on workforce member’s overall perception of the 
success of specific training sources in relation to 
demographics and specific acquisition initiatives proposed 
since 1994.  The results of this chapter suggest that 
current acquisition workforce training inadequately 
supports acquisition reform initiatives for a variety of 
reasons.  Chapter V concludes with a discussion of these 
reasons and some potential recommendations to improve DoD 
acquisition workforce training as a means of supporting 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this research was to determine if DoD 
acquisition reform initiatives are fully supported by 
current acquisition workforce training.  Although a 
definitive answer, yes or no, is difficult to provide, 
information presented in Chapter II, Literature Review and 
Background, and results from the acquisition workforce 
survey do support some general conclusions.   
Unfortunately, even among those sources rated most 
effective, survey respondents’ average ratings were only 
slightly above average (14.76 out of a possible 24) and 
there was little meaningful differentiation between the 
lowest and highest rated training sources (14.76 and 
11.76).  Considering the results from both survey 
respondents and information discussed in the literature 
review, the evidence suggests that DoD acquisition reform 
is not adequately supported by current acquisition 
workforce training.  
The conclusions resulting from the research survey 
varied with respect to the identified sources of training 
and between specific acquisition reform initiatives.   
Based on the survey results, some sources are more 
effective than others at providing acquisition reform 
training.  The more effective sources of training include 
traditional forms of education and training such as DAU 
resident courses and Government funded education.   
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The strong negative perception (rated 7.84/24.00, 
Table 4.12) of DAU web-based courses as a least effective 
source of training by survey respondents is of serious 
concern.  According to survey results, DAU web-based 
courses lack substance necessary to functionally implement 
acquisition reform initiatives (See Table 4.12).  Budget 
constraints and continuing reductions in the size of the 
DoD acquisition workforce will continue to increase the 
importance of web-based training.  This trend has 
significantly changed DAU’s focus and has resulted in a 
large number of web-based training courses being developed 
and fielded during the last few years.  If DAU is to be 
successful in providing web-based instruction, courses must 
be developed that are perceived by the workforce as being a 
valuable training resource. 
The data suggest the turbulence caused by the number 
and magnitude of proposed acquisition reforms may be 
adversely impacting the ability of DoD to effectively 
provide functional training supporting acquisition reform.  
In a rush to leverage the latest and greatest reform 
initiatives, the size of DoD frustrates effective attempts 
to timely coordinate with training providers.  According to 
survey results, DoD continues to struggle providing 
acquisition reform training supporting such initiatives as 
past performance evaluation that have been fielded for 
several years.   
Results of the literature review also indicate the 
workforce is overwhelmed by the large numbers of current 
initiatives proposed and are disenchanted by DoD senior 
leadership’s expectations that reforms are panaceas for 
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dwindling personnel and acquisition resources.  The ability 
of DoD to functionally implement key acquisition reform 
initiatives even after training has been provided is less 
than impressive as evidenced by data generated by this 
research (see Table 4.4).  Based on survey results, many 
promising initiatives such as incentive term contracting 
and share-in-savings are only being implemented by a small 
percentage of the workforce, potentially due to inadequate 
training. 
Considering the scarcity of training resources in 
terms of both acquisition workforce members’ time and the 
availability of training funds, DoD should completely re-
examine the overall focus of acquisition workforce 
training.  Since the implementation of DAWIA in 1991, 
acquisition workforce training has been focused on meeting 
DAWIA mandated certification standards.  This may not be an 
appropriate focus if the intent is to provide the workforce 
with the tools to successfully operate in today’s rapidly 
changing business environment.  Given finite resources, the 
co-existence of both acquisition reform and DAWIA 
certification training goals may not be practical unless 
those certification standards are aligned with reform 
objectives.    
The majority of the these conclusions are based on the 
workforce survey conducted in support of this research and 
are the perceptions of a relatively small and segmented 
(Army) sample of the acquisition workforce.  Although 
acquisition workforce members are the training recipients 
and implementers of acquisition reform initiatives, they 
represent only a small constituency of a highly complex 
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process that influences meaningful progress in acquisition 
reform.  Congress, private industry, socio-economic special 
interest groups and others exert considerable influence 
over the DoD acquisition process and the subsequent 
effectiveness of meaningful acquisition reform.  Therefore, 
it would be shortsighted for the reader to attribute the 
success or failure of acquisition reform solely to the 




This section provides recommendations to improve 
acquisition reform training provided to the DoD acquisition 
workforce.  These recommendations are based on the 
information provided in Chapter II, Literature Review and 
Background, and the results of the acquisition workforce 
survey discussed in Chapter IV, Survey Data and Analysis.  
The recommendations are divided into the following four 
areas: 
• Strengthen the DoD Continuous Learning Policy 
• Strengthen/Support In-House Advocates’ Role 
• Improve Quality of Web-Based Instruction 
• Reduce Number of Reform Initiatives  
 
1. Strengthen the DoD Continuous Learning Policy 
 
The intent of the DAWIA was to “professionalize” the 
defense acquisition workforce through certification 
standards based on various levels of specialized training.  
Unfortunately, DoD did not anticipate the rapid number of 
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changes and subsequent proliferation of acquisition reforms 
proposed since the implementation of DAWIA in 1991.  In 
principal the 1999 Continuous Learning Policy should have 
corrected this shortcoming, but failed to correlate 
specific training objectives or acquisition reform 
initiatives and fulfillment of minimum continuous learning 
standards (80 “qualifying” hours every two years). 
Continuous learning standards cannot be generically 
applied to all workforce members if the subject training is 
to be used to support meaningful acquisition reform.  As 
discussed throughout this study, members assigned to 
different acquisition positions and organizations have 
widely divergent responsibilities.  As such, acquisition 
reform training must be tailored according to individual 
workforce member needs and responsibilities.  Effective 
training must also meet the other critical criteria 
discussed in the acquisition workforce survey (see survey 
questions 18 through 33):    
• Adequate in detail to functionally implement 
• Adequately disseminated in organization to create 
mutual understanding 
• Follow-up/refresher training provided 
• Provided in a timely manner, not too late or too 
early 
The responsibility to identify directed continuous 
learning objectives and subsequent appropriate training 
sources rests with the supervisor.  Supervisors must 
understand the goals of the Continuous Learning policy and 
be willing to tailor their workforce members’ Individual 
Development Plans to focus on appropriate training.  Based 
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on the literature review, no such training is currently 
being provided to acquisition workforce leadership. 
Part of the solution may require realignment of 
supervisor incentives to proactively identify appropriate 
training for their acquisition workforce members.  Annual 
performance goals of acquisition workforce supervisors 
should include identification and scheduling of appropriate 
continuous learning opportunities as one of their critical 
evaluation criteria.  During annual performance reviews, 
the success of accomplishing these training objectives 
should be assessed against individual and organization 
goals. 
In addition, DoD should consider shifting the focus 
away from DAWIA certification to targeted training more 
attuned to the prevailing business climate.  The generic 
application of DAWIA training across DoD’s diverse 
acquisition missions and organizations is not practical nor 
has the training kept pace with the rapid proliferation of 
acquisition reform initiatives and DoD’s subsequent 
attempts to leverage best commercial practices.  Shifting 
to targeted training will provide better utilization of 
scarce training resources and provide necessary funds to 
support meaningful acquisition reform training to a greater 
percentage of the workforce. 
Another potential recommendation is to allow partial 
credit of acquisition reform training toward DAWIA 
certification requirements.  This policy would provide 
flexibility based on workforce member’s individual 
responsibilities and optimize use of training budgets.  
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2. Strengthen/Support In-House Advocate’s Role 
 
Based on survey results, in-house Acquisition Reform 
Advocates were frequently cited and highly rated as an 
effective source of acquisition reform training (see Tables 
4.7, 4.9 and 4.10).  Considering DoD’s movement away from 
resident training courses and the current negative 
perception of web-based training, these in-house advocates 
will continue to be a valuable source of acquisition reform 
training.  DoD should leverage in-house acquisition reform 
advocates’ unique advantages by providing specialized 
training to enhance and reinforce their ability to 
effectively support acquisition reform.    
The “train-the-trainer” concept has been widely 
utilized throughout DoD and appears to be a potentially 
useful approach with in-house advocates supporting 
effective acquisition reform training.  Not only are in-
house advocates perceived as an effective source of 
training, they solve many time and place constraint 
concerns inherent to other training sources.  
One potential drawback to the in-house advocate is the 
availability of properly trained in-house reform advocates 
in smaller acquisition organizations.  Although individuals 
in any size office can assume acquisition reform advocate 
responsibilities, the importance of excessive collateral 
duties is quickly diluted when individuals “wear too many 
hats.”  This should be less of a concern as the Army (and 
possibly other services) realigns into the three proposed 
Army Contracting Agencies, consolidating acquisition 
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responsibilities and most personnel into “super” 
contracting centers.  
 
3. Improve Quality of Web-Based Instruction 
 
Due to financial constraints and decreasing personnel 
resources, travel to off-site resident courses will 
continue to decline.  Distance learning technologies such 
as web-based instruction provide the greatest opportunity 
to provide necessary acquisition reform training and still 
meet time and place concerns associated with the current 
and future acquisition workforce.  Unfortunately, according 
to the research survey, web-based acquisition reform 
training was poorly rated across all effectiveness 
criteria. 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) must 
aggressively invest in the development of quality web-based 
training resources consistent with the objectives of 
specific acquisition reform initiatives.  The training 
should be provided in sufficient detail and depth to 
support functional implementation by the acquisition 
workforce member.    
DAU should take notice of current acquisition reform 
initiatives and divest itself of activities that do not 
reflect core competencies, especially those that can be 
accomplished much more effectively in the private 
marketplace.  Partnering with or completely outsourcing the 
development of web-based courses may be a potential 
solution to the current situation.  As discussed in Chapter 
II, DAU has made minor progress in this area by sponsoring 
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the National Contract Management Association and Institute 
for Supply Management to co-develop two acquisition 
training courses supporting acquisition reform initiatives.  
If the outsourcing of these courses proves successful, DAU 
should consider outsourcing future course development to 
non-Government sources.        
 
4. Reduce the Number of Reform Initiatives  
 
Based on this research, the overall number of 
acquisition reform initiatives proposed during the last 
decade has been excessive.  Given this fact, DoD may 
benefit from selecting and focusing their training efforts 
on a few key initiatives that have the potential to yield 
substantial benefits.  Considering the diversity of 
missions and costs associated with providing effective 
training, doing a few things right appears to be more 
beneficial than attempting to do everything with mediocre 
results at best.   
Leadership and the acquisition workforce are still 
struggling to implement reforms that were introduced as 
early as 1994 with the introduction of FASA.  Perhaps Ross 
Branstetter best describes the acquisition workforce’s 
perception of acquisition reform “… in recent years 
acquisition efforts and the acquisition process have been 
buffeted by profound, nearly constant disruption.53”  This 
perception is not encouraging and has the potential to lead 
to widespread apathy in the workforce.  
  53  Branstetter, Ross W.  “Acquisition Reform: All Sail and No Rudder”, The 
Army Lawyer, pp. 3-14, March 1998. 
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DoD needs to reduce the number of acquisition reform 
initiatives, clearly prioritize those initiatives that are 
in existence today, and provide resources to follow through 
on new initiatives fielded.  There is widespread agreement 
among Congress, DoD Leadership, the acquisition workforce 
and contractors that substantial changes are necessary in 
the management of DoD acquisition.  Unfortunately, the 
acquisition workforce is confused as to the relative 
importance of the various initiatives.      
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
DoD acquisition reform and training related issues 
provide innumerable opportunities for future research.  The 
following is a summary of potential issues that surfaced 
during the subject research and merit further 
consideration. 
• Does DoD change management training adequately 
support implementation of acquisition reform 
initiatives? 
• How does DoD acquisition reform training compare 
with other federal, state and local Governments’ 
efforts?  What are the opportunities to 
consolidate/leverage training resources between 
these entities? 
• How do socio-economic goals complement/conflict 
with acquisition reform initiatives? 
• What are the costs and benefits of providing 
acquisition reform training via web-based courses 
when compared to tradition resident courses?  
Considering the costs and benefits, what is the 
Best Value to the Government? 
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• How do the different services (Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Marines) manage acquisition reform 
training?  Has the Defense Acquisition University 
effectively coordinated/consolidated these 
efforts? 
• Is adequate funding provided to support 
acquisition training consistent with DAWIA 
mandated certification and the DoD Continuous 
Learning policy?  Should the structure and intent 
of the DAWIA be changed to meet today’s rapidly 
changing business environment?  
• What incentives are provided to the workforce to 
motivate successful implementation of acquisition 
reform initiatives?  To what extent are these 
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